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EDUCATION FOR MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

EDUCATION FOR MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT

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The writer examines and critiques the cognitive-developmental theory of moral growth with a view to translating it into a theory of spiritual development. The moral development approaches of Piaget and Kohlberg are examined in detail and are found to be theoretically elegant but biased in their almost exclusive reliance on the cognitive domain to explain moral behavior. It is suggested that moral theorists might fruitfully look at the findings of depth psychologists such as Carl Jung and Erick Neumann whose investigations of the unconscious offer an affective complement to Piaget and Kohlberg's cognitive orientation particularly in explaining discrepancies between moral thinking and behavior.

Spirituality is defined as the domain of ultimate meaning and value as perceived by individuals and around which they attempt to orient their lives. The writer suggests that there are spiritual

stages parallel to Kohlberg's moral stages whereby individuals define the meaning of their intuitive spiritual experiences in personal and social terms. The lack of spiritual stage development has probably caused many sublime spiritual experiences to be translated into repressive social correlates.

Finally the writer examines several different moral education endeavors including his own, most of which have a cognitive developmental or humanistic orientation, and outlines a teacher-training program designed to educate teachers adept at facilitating both moral and spiritual development.

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INTRODUCTION

The following paper is written from the philosophical perspective which considers education to be a special kind of human interaction, which, however structured, has as its goal human growth and development. In recent years Piaget and Kohlberg have proposed psychological theories of cognitive and moral development which have stimulated an increasingly large body of research. Their theories have also inspired educators to apply their developmental insights to the educational process. In the realm of moral education, which is one of the principal foci of this paper, a wide variety of curricula, designed from the developmental viewpoint, are becoming available. Curriculum research and design has, in turn, led to an examination of the atmosphere of the school in which the curriculum is taught. Kohlberg (1972) is of the opinion that this atmosphere exercises an overriding influence on the developmental progress of students. The structures that define administrative, teacher and student roles, relationships and attitudes can powerfully reinforce the developmental orientation of a given curriculum or virtually cancel it out.

And so the purview of developmental education continues to broaden. New findings suggest further questions and still newer areas to research. The first purpose of this paper is to examine the research into the psychology of moral development (Chapter II) and

some of the educational applications stimulated by it (Chapter IV) in an open-ended and sometimes critical way. It is open-ended because I suspect that developmental psychology is just getting its legs under itself and that educators have scarcely begun to explore its relevance to their own discipline.

It is critical because of a tendency in the cognitive-developmental approach of Kohlberg to pass over important contributions of other psychological schools to the understanding of the developing moral agent. Kohlberg's theory, which focuses on the cognitive aspects of moral judgment, has a theoretical elegance about it that is hard to resist. Emotional and other non-rational motivating factors, on the other hand, tend to be opaque, resistant to human understanding in both practice and theory. The temptation, therefore, is to work with clear and distinct conceptualizations rather than with the amorphous and indistinct realm of the non-rational which escapes easy categorization. I think the cognitive developmental school in general tends to fall prey to this temptation and that this is reflected in curricula inspired by them.

My own ventures into moral curriculum development have included the uses of techniques derived from Gestalt Therapy and other humanistic psychologies to enable learners to tap the more intuitive and affective aspects of their personality which constitute the ground of their moral thinking and action (Chapter IV). At the same time, however, I have utilized Kohlberg's stage theory as an organizing framework lest moral dialogue degenerate into the exchange of mutually irreconcilable opinions.

The second purpose of this paper is to use research into moral development as a point of departure to speculate about possible developmental features in the religious or spiritual realm. Kohlberg has raised the issue himself (Kohlberg, 1971, 1973) in his speculations about a meta-ethical stage 7, as has the theologian Fowler (1973) working in concert with Kohlberg. Kohlberg suggests that in the experience of meaninglessness and despair brought on by confronting the reality of death, rational moral codes and commitments crumble. When the fundamental meaning of life is questioned, so inevitably is a morality based on reason alone. In terms reminiscent of Gestalt psychology, Kohlberg sees the solution to such a dilemma in an experiential shift from figure to ground. At such a moment (often but not always during a mystical or peak experience) our ego-perspective (figure) is replaced by a cosmic perspective (ground). We perceive and value life from the cosmic or infinite perspective rather than from our customary, finite viewpoint. Supposedly we experience meaning at a deeper (or higher, Stage 7, level) which, in turn validates our commitment to purposive and moral action.

Whatever the validity of Kohlberg's philosophic speculations, his comments raise the issue of whether one can integrate often highly subjective and essentially incommunicable intuitive experiences into a universal, developmental framework. It also raises the questions of how does one's basic meaning and value orientation in the world relate to one's moral stance. I attempt to deal with some of these issues in Chapter III.

Finally, I propose the tentative outlines of a curriculum for

teachers (Chapter V) in which I attempt to integrate the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education with other psychologies more oriented to affective and unconscious motivations. In addition there are modules which raise some of the philosophic issues considered in Chapter III concerning meaning and morality. The orientation of the curriculum is to encourage students to trust and use their own experience. Exercises are designed to broaden their awareness and cognitive constructs to assist them to organize their experience into meaningful patterns.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

Moral education in some form or other has been part of the human enterprise from the very beginning. As long as people have associated together in groups, certain norms have governed their relationships with each other and the world and this, in turn, has necessitated teaching these norms to new members of the group. Naturally what was taught and how has varied as greatly as the many forms of society which have evolved all over the planet.

Although the teaching of morality has been a conscious undertaking of humankind for many centuries, it has only recently become a self conscious preoccupation. With the greater differentiation of human consciousness and the development of more and more specialties and competencies of knowledge, educators have turned increasingly not only to philosophers, theologians and religious authorities for guidance but also to psychologists and sociologists. The increased social scientific emphasis has focused attention more on the process of moral education and less on what was to be taught. The distinction between the process of moral education and its content is relatively recent but crucial to understanding the current state of the art. Process pays attention to how the learner learns both with regard to what happens within (intra-psychically) as he or she receives and organizes

information, and what happens without in the learning environment, that is how social and ecological conditions, teaching strategies, techniques, etc., facilitate or hinder moral growth. The content of moral education are the attitudes, values and moral judgments which a learner assimilates or develops. While these are commonly expressed as axioms or commandments, e.g., 'it is better to give than to receive,' 'thou shalt not kill,' they are not always so easily articulated nor immediately applicable to a given situation. For example, an increased respect for human life or a greater sensitivity and responsiveness to inequities in the social system need not be reducible to concise adages but nevertheless represent genuine moral growth.

There are nearly as many differences of opinion concerning the process of moral education as there are about what ought to be taught. Several attempts have been made to arrange the various approaches schematically. Kohlberg (1964) categorizes the literature he reviewed according to the importance researchers give to behavior, emotions, or moral judgment, respectively. Later, however, he and Mayer (1972) suggest that general educational approaches, including moral education can be categorized according to three underlying psychological and philosophic positions: 1) the <u>romantic</u> position represented by Freud, Gesell and A. S. Neill's <u>Summerhill</u>; 2) <u>cultural transmission</u> derived from the classic academic tradition of Western education, and 3) <u>progressivism</u>, represented by Dewey, and more recently modified by Piaget and Kohlberg himself as the cognitive-developmental approach.

According to Kohlberg and Mayer, adherents of the romantic approach view human development through the metaphor of organic growth. Mental development unfolds according to prepatterned, genetically determined stages. The environment provides little more than nourishment for that growth. Emotional and moral development also evolve through hereditary stages, such as the Freudian psychosexual stages, but remain independent of cognitive development. The latter depends on knowledge of the social world; the former is a biological given which, unless frustrated and fixated by the environment, unfolds of its own accord.

The cultural transmission model views the development of the mind through the metaphor of the machine. The environment imprints relatively unprocessed input or data directly on the mind where they are accumulated and elicited by an appropriate stimulus or emitted under appropriate stimulus conditions. Learning is defined in terms of specific responses or behaviors which can be shaped by reward, praise or feedback. Educational systems as apparently disparate as the United States and Soviet public schools and the Catholic parochial schools (at least those uninfluenced by the Church reforms begun in the mid-1960's) rely heavily on the cultural transmission model. This model seems especially congenial to the educational techniques derived from behaviorism and social learning theory.

The progressive or cognitive developmental metaphor is not material but dialectical. It is analagous to a conversation or dialogue which consists in the confrontation of ideas and opinions with the opposites. The consequent interaction (or as some prefer, trans-

action) stimulates cognitive, moral, and affective development, for these three realms are parallel aspects of a unified structural reorganization that occurs in development. (As we shall see, the cognitive developmentalists better exemplify this structural unity in theory than in their concrete applications.)

Referring back to Kohlberg's (1964) earlier categorization of education approaches, Kohlberg and Mayer assert that the cultural transmission viewpoint emphasizes behavior, the romantic viewpoint inner states and feelings and the progressive point of view coordinates the two. Again I note in passing that in fact the cognitive developmental viewpoint, at least as represented by Kohlberg and his colleagues, in actual practice emphasizes cognitive and judgmental skills and deals with the behavioral and affective aspects of moral education only tangentially.

Hoffman (1970) in an extensive (99-page) review of moral education literature, organizes his material according to a tripartite schema somewhat different from either Kohlberg or Kohlberg and Mayer. He asserts that there are three philosophical doctrines which bear on both theorists' and practitioners' approaches to moral education: the "original sin" doctrine, the "innate purity" doctrine, and the "tabula rasa" (blank slate) doctrine.

In psychological circles--the original sin advocates stress the importance of early intervention by adults to protect children from their own anarchic tendencies and to socialize them. The moral education process is identified with teaching children to adhere to and ultimately to internalize the norms laid down by society. The most

characteristic modern representative of this approach in the psychoanalytic tradition is epitomized in Bruno Bettelheim who says: "one can live successfully and learn well in school as long as one's growing up begins with a very firm and stringent morality based on fear and trembling" (cited in Stewart, 1974, pp 165-166).

Hoffman's second category, derived from the doctrine of innate purity, resembles Kohlberg and Mayer's romantic classification and both ascribe it (probably wrongfully) to Jean Jacques Rousseau. Surprisingly, Hoffman classifies Piaget (and by implication Kohlberg) as the main present day representative of the innate purity approach! According to Hoffman, adherents of this approach believe that adult and societal influences should be kept to a minimum during a child's formative years because they are primarily corrupting. It is true that during his early work on moral development Piaget (1965) believed that young children, who experience adult rules as alien and heteronomous, could best develop morally through interaction with their peers only (a point on which he and Kohlberg differ). His increasing emphasis on the importance of the development of role-taking perspectives, however, implies an intense social participation at variance with a concern for the "corrupting influences of society" characteristic of the innate purity doctrine.

Hoffman's third category is founded on the tabula rasa doctrine which views the human psyche as an infinitely malleable blank. In this it resembles Kohlberg and Mayer's cultural transmission category and both articles assign the learning theorists to this group. Hoffman, himself a learning theorist, notes that this third category shares the

psychoanalyst's concern that without early adult intervention the child's primary motivation would continue to be the gratification of biological drives.

In terms of moral motivation Hoffman asserts that Piaget locates it in conscious prior judgments of rightness or wrongness; Freudian theory in largely unconscious attempts to repress powerful irrational forces; and learning theory in responses to extrinsic rewards and punishments with little or no accompanying rationale. Here again he notes an overlap among more recent learning theorists who consider such internal motivation as altruism and consideration for others.

A more recent attempt at organizing and making some sense out of the mass of philosophic speculation and research data concerning moral education is that of John Stewart (1973, 1974). He lists four approaches to moral education.

1. Traditional-Authoritarian Approach (Absolute Nomothetic). This approach views values as absolute givens which are externally objective and embodied or reflected in the traditions of society. The human person is viewed either as a blank slate (tabula rasa) or inclined toward depravity. In either case people require guidance and their values need to be formed or inculcated by knowledgeable guardians of tradition of the Truth (scientific, secular or religious.) External or behavioral conformity is of paramount importance and is obtained by a set of psychological education techniques most congenial to this approach derive from behaviorism with its emphasis on eliciting discrete, observable responses.

2. Cultural Relativistic (Relative Nomothetic). The proponents of this approach, according to Stewart, believe that values are absolutes for a given society but relative across societies. Values are defined by and objectively exist in a given culture but it does not follow from this the same values would have equal validity in another society. Like the traditional authoritative approach, the human person is viewed either as a blank slate or inclined toward depravity. In both cases the process of socialization is considered of primary importance and this is accomplished more on the level of feeling and emotions than on either the cognitive or behavioral levels. The development of interpersonal relationships, role modeling, and conformity to peer expectations are effective means of advancing the socialization process. Psychoanalytic techniques, adjustment counseling and social learning theory strategies can be used singly or in combination to aid the process the motivating force of which is primarily guilt or anxiety about meeting or failing to meet the standards of society.

3. Absolute Relativistic Approach (Idiographic). In reaction to the structures of the two above-mentioned approaches to morality, a more recent viewpoint has developed which considers all values to be of equal validity uniquely determined as they are by each individual from his or her own conscience. Values are a subjective matter and therefore no one may legitimately judge another's values if the latter has truly consulted his or her own thoughts and feelings on a given matter. The human personality enjoys a fundamental goodness which, if heeded, will unfailingly incline it to make right and good decisions. This

viewpoint is founded on some of the tenents of existential and humanistic philosophies, especially insofar as they emphasize the uniqueness of the individual, the holism of the person and the basic drive toward self-actualization.

The educational techniques of values clarification, sensitivity training and even some indoctrination, e.g., about the basic goodness of human nature or one's feelings, are used in this approach. It is unclear, however, how individual self-actualization is integrated into community purposes and goals.

4. Organismic Structural Development Approach (Universal Transactional). Like both Hoffman and Kohlberg, Stewart saves what he considers the most adequate moral-philosophical position (his own) to the last. Drawing heavily on Piaget and Kohlberg he defines values as neither strictly subjective nor objective but sees them as the outcome of a transaction between the developing organism and its environment. Ultimately those values have universal applicability because they are based on fundamental biosocial determinants which are structurally verified everywhere. Regarding the innate goodness or depravity of human nature, this approach maintains a neutral stance although it recognizes a basic dynamism that inclines the human personality both toward a more holistic integration within itself and a more adequate and universal value system.

The organismic structural approach is naturally congenial to the cognitive developmental educational strategies which include democratic involvement, developmental parenting, the induction of disequilibrium and some values clarification techniques.

Summary

At this point the reader may be somewhat confused by the variety of overlapping categories set forth by the authors in their attempts to simplify matters! In an attempt to sum up I will simply mention that initially Kohlberg divided moral education theory according to whether it focused primarily on behavior, emotion or moral judgment. Later he and Mayer elaborated a more complex schema but never fully relinquished this basic approach. Their cultural transmission category resembles the earlier behavior category although it is more elaborate. The same can be said for a comparison between the emotion category and the later romantic position; and obviously between the moral judgment category and the progressive or cognitive developmental viewpoint. Stewart provides an even more elaborate schema but moves in the same direction. His distinctions appear even more carefully thought out and also provide some sense of the historical movement of moral education. His distinction between the traditional authoritarian and cultural relativistic approaches is useful in that it demonstrates what they have in common, a belief in values as objective things, as well as where they differ: (a) the former absolutizes values, the latter sees them as relative to a given society; and (b) the former leans more heavily toward behavioral techniques, the latter toward the psychoanalytic. Otherwise his absolute relativistic approach appears virtually identical to Kohlberg and Mayer's definition of the romantic position and his organismic structural developmental approach closely resembles their progressive position.

Hoffman's division of the literature into "original sin,"

"innate purity" and "tabula rasa" positions is somewhat misleading if his readers assume that these are systematic philosophic positions. He seems, instead, to use these terms as a convenient way to organize the extensive amount of research which he has reviewed.

Nevertheless each of his three positions gets at a part of the truth about human nature and none should be ignored. As we shall see in the following chapter, there is an anomic element in human nature, resembling Hoffman's "original sin" category, that resists all efforts to tame it. There is also an innately creative and spiritual element, similar to his "innate purity," which tends to lift us up above ourselves. The "blank slate" category seems most appropriately applied to human cognitive and social functions which have little in the line of instinct to guide them. It is only when one of these positions is preferred to all the others that a sectarian narrow-mindedness begins to intrude itself.

The virtue of the cognitive developmental position, which we consider in some detail in the following chapter, is that it attempts to synthesize the several positions outlined above which, at first glance, seem to be irreconcilable. It values the influence of the environment without falling prey to environmental determinism. It appreciates the dynamic quality of the human mind without falling into solipsism or opposing the goodness of the human spirit to the corrupting influence of the environment. Less successfully, perhaps, it attempts to integrate thought, feeling and action into unified schemata or structures without relegating each to a separate compartment.

But even synthetic theories have their biases and cognitive

developmentalism is no exception. As we shall see, despite claims to the contrary, it continues to focus rather narrowly on cognitive functions of the person. Unconscious, affective, imaginative, intuitive, spiritual faculties do not receive equal billing, except for the claim that they too fit somehow into comprehensive mental structures.

Despite its obvious inadequacies, it remains, in my opinion the single most provocative psychological moral theory to date. It asserts that morality is a distinctively human enterprise of enormous complexity which cannot be compared with functions of sub-human species. It has attempted to integrate the cognitive, affective and social aspects of human existence into a universal set of schemata which remove from morality the passionate, sectarian overtones which in recent times have caused the very expression "moral" to be associated with narrow-minded obscurantism. And finally it has provoked a thoughtful reexamination of the moral education enterprise to encourage the teaching of morality itself in a more moral way. Hence it merits more extended treatment which I undertake in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH

1. Introduction. In this chapter I will review the work of the two cognitive-developmentalists who have contributed most toward evolving a coherent theory of moral development: Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Since the moral development corpus of the former consists of one book: The Moral Judgment of the Child originally published in 1932 and since the latter has contributed a steady stream of articles, several of almost book length, since his doctoral dissertation on moral development was accepted by the University of Chicago in 1958, this chapter will be weighted toward Kohlberg's work. The reader should be aware, however, that behind Kohlberg stands Piaget on whom he relies quite heavily particularly for a general theory of cognitive development. Kohlberg's own theory nevertheless is unique and in many aspects he has gone far beyond his mentor as we shall see.

After looking at the work of both these men, I will cite some of the confirmatory and contradictory findings of follow-up studies particularly of Kohlberg's theory, offer my own critique, and suggest new directions for future explorations particularly in the realm of affect and action.

2. Piaget and Moral Development. Piaget investigated Swiss children's moral thinking somewhat obliquely by determining their attitudes toward rules for a game of marbles. He found that, because of

cognitive limitations, young children (ages 3-8) seem to confuse physical laws with moral rules so that they believe that rules are fixed, external things rather than derived from human intentions and values. The cognitive limitations contributing to this confusion are "realism", that is younger children's inability to distinguish subjective from objective experiences (e.g., believing a dream has some external reality) and cognitive ego-centrism, that is an inability to realize that others perceive things from a different perspective than themselves. Moreover, according to Piaget, young children exhibit a unilateral respect toward adults to whom they defer because they view them as perfect and all-knowing. The combination of realism, egocentrism and unilateral respect induce young children to view rules as sacred and unchangeable. Piaget terms this form of morality heteronomous. His subsequent investigations confirmed his initial impressions. He interviewed a number of Swiss children of different ages up to early teens by asking their reaction to a series of stories. For example: who is more worthy of a reprimand, the boy who breaks one cup while disobeying his mother by taking a cooky or the boy who breaks a whole tray of cups he didn't see while coming through a door? He found that younger children judged the wrong by the quantity of physical damage done. They also displayed a belief in immanent justice, that is that one could expect automatic retribution for misdeeds.

Older children, by contrast, appeared progressively less bound by realism, more able to see others' perspectives and were more trustful of their own judgments in counterdistinction to completely deferring to their elders. They were also more inclined to judge morality

by intention rather than by the physical consequences of an action and belief in immanent justice practically vanished by age twelve. Piaget attributed these changes 1) to intellectual growth and 2) to experiences of role-taking particularly among peers. The latter, he believed, was the principal dynamic of moral growth. So long as adults try to impose on children their own moral views they only reinforce the unilateral respect and deference to superior power characteristic of heteronomous morality. Indeed, Piaget is pessimistic about the role parents play in moral development. "The 'average parent' is like an unintelligent government, that is content to accumulate laws in spite of the contradictions which this accumulation leads to." (Piaget, 1965, p. 192). He believed that the more mature, autonomous stage of morality is achieved primarily through the interaction of children among themselves from which mutual respect, solidarity and reciprocity characteristic of autonomous morality evolve.

Unfortunately Piaget has not chosen to pursue his investigations into moral development begun almost 45 years ago. In an interview several years ago he claimed to have "other pies in the oven." (Hall, 1970). His "other pies" have been principally in the area of cognitive development and a new discipline practically of his own invention called genetic epistomology. He has remained a theoretician principally concerned with investigating a question asked by philosophers and psychologists: how do human beings know and structure the world in which they live. Educators are well advised to heed the words of David Elkind (Piaget, 1968, pp. xv-xvi) of one of his principal English language interpreters:

> Of particular note is the fact that Piaget nowhere points to the practical implications of his work....If one looks carefully through Piaget's writings one seldom, if ever, finds an attempt to deal with concrete problems of pedagogy or child rearing.... Some educators have engaged in certain teaching practices in the name of Piaget. What should always be made clear in such cases is that it is the educators interpretation of Piaget which is being utilized and not Piaget's own ideas about educational practice. If Piaget has such, he seldom voices them.

Despite Piaget's own lack of interest either in following up his initial research into moral development or in making practical pedogogical suggestions concerning it, many subsequent investigators attempted to replicate his studies elsewhere to determine if, indeed, older and younger children display two distinct forms of moral thinking.

Hoffman,(1970) summarizes much of the research undertaken and I will not repeat it here except to mention that the findings were somewhat confusing. For example, regarding the decrease in belief in immanent justice as children mature, studies by Jahoda,(1958) of West African school children and Dennis,(1943) of Hopi children confirmed a decrease in belief in immanent justice as Piaget's findings would predict. On the other hand, Havighurst and Neugarten,(1935) found a greater belief in immanent justice among older children of six out of ten native American tribes than among younger children of the same tribes. In a more recent study not mentioned by Hoffman, Najarian-Svajian,(1966) observed a similar phenomenon among Lebanese children living in their native country among whom belief in immanent justice seemed to stabilize and not to diminish by age twelve.

Hoffman concludes that Piaget's two-stage theory of moral development is not a universal, invariant, sequential phenomenon as

cognitive developmentalists would assert. This conclusion, however, is premature and arises from a failure to distinguish between structure and content in stage theory. The confusion is understandable because Piaget did not make the distinction in his work on moral thinking (later in his work on cognitive development he elaborated the distinction quite clearly as we will see in a moment). Nor did Kohlberg initially observe the distinction as precisely as he could have which led to a subsequent revision of his own stage theory of moral development. Before turning to Kohlberg himself, therefore, it might be helpful to explain how both Piaget and Kohlberg distinguish between structure and content in developmental stage theory.

Structure and Content in Stage Theory. The distinction grows out of Piaget's later and more systematic study of cognitive processes. For him a structure is "a systematic whole of self-regulating transformations" (Piaget,1970 cited in Stewart,1974, p. 215). It is a systematic whole insofar as a set of laws apply impartially to an entire system, for example to a set of whole numbers, or to the classification of certain elements according to predetermined categories. It is self-regulating because elements within the structure interact with each other but remain within their own system. Thus adding or subtracting whole numbers still leaves us with a whole number, (plus or minus) not, for example, with a fraction which would be outside the system. A structure transforms its elements. It is a dynamic process, classifying, re-arranging, adding, subtracting, reversing, etc., according to its own self-consistent laws. Thus, for example, when one grasps the grammatical rules of language one can formulate original sentences,

paragraphs, stories, etc., while remaining within the structure established by grammar.

Mutatis mutandis both Piaget and Kohlberg now claim that such structures best explain the development of logical and moral thinking. A series of structures of ever-increasing complexity and comprehensiveness called stages succeed each other in a universal, invariant hierarchical sequence. Relying on Piaget, Kohlberg, (1969) explains cognitive stages as transformations of earlier cognitive structures as a person interacts with the social environment and the world. Whatever data the person is presented with is assimilated within a given stage structure. If the data are too diverse or complex a new, more subtle and complex cognitive structure is required as an accommodation of the thinking organism to this new reality. This new stage-structure reorganizes and reintegrates the former, more primitive structure into itself. Cognitive stages (both logical and moral) then have the following general characteristics (Kohlberg,1969, pp. 348-349):

> 1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in children's modes of thinking or of solving the same problem at different ages.
>
> 2. These different modes of thought form an invariant sequence, order, or succession in individual development. While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, they do not change its sequence.
>
> 3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a "structured whole." A given stage-response on a task does not just represent a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it. Rather, it represents an underlying thought-organization...which determines responses to tasks which are not manifestly similar....
>
> 4. Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations. Stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to fulfill a common function....

Content then is the data or information presented for consideration. The way the information is handled however, will depend on the stage of development of the individual. A small child may group four marbles and two rubber balls into a family where the marbles are the "babies" and the rubber balls the "father and mother". An older child may group them according to their material, function (used in different games) size, etc. A still older person may hypothesize and attempt to test out what they are made of, where they came from, what the experimenter wants to accomplish with them, etc., each according to his or her stage of development.

To return to Hoffman's original objection to wit: Piaget's moral stages are not true stages, i.e., they are not universal nor sequential because the phenomenon of immanent justice increases with age in some cultures instead of declining. Immanent justice is not a structural characteristic. It is a belief, that is a content, arising spontaneously among some young children because of cognitive limitations and sometimes reinforced by more general cultural beliefs. The limitations imposed by simpler cognitive structures should not be confused with the beliefs to which they may partially give rise.

Secondly, according to Kohlberg, moral judgment is a sphere of reasoning distinct from logical thinking. The latter is a necessary but not sufficient cause of the former. Hence, even though one's logical thought processes may mature, say, to Piaget's level of formal operations, that in itself does not guarantee the attainment of a concomitant level of moral reasoning. It is therefore possible that, with cultural and religious reinforcement, belief in immanent justice

may persist into adulthood and co-exist along with sophisticated logical thinking. This would be the result of more primitive moral (and perhaps religious) cognitive structures which have not kept pace with intellectual development. Indeed it is precisely my contention in this dissertation (to which I will devote more attention later in this chapter and in chapter three) that while moral and spiritual development require a cognitive base, they also require specific treatment and attention in their own right. Their evolution is by no means an inevitable outgrowth of the development of logical tools and skills.

An increase in belief in immanent justice with age, which Hoffman considers so devastating to stage theory, because it seems to reverse the purported sequence of development, is actually compatible with sequential and irreversible structural development. The immanent justice phenomenon is explainable as a logical consequence of arrested moral-structural development combined with reinforcing cultural influences. In Piagetian terms it could easily be the outcome of a form of horizontal decalage or generalization as one appropriates a stage more firmly and perhaps fixedly. However, to ascertain this, an instrument which detects the structural outlines underlying the content of the responses would have to be employed and this was not done in the studies cited.

3. Lawrence Kohlberg. Let us turn our attention now to Kohlberg. Unlike Piaget, practically all of his attention has been focused on moral development since he wrote his doctoral dissertation (Kohlberg, 1958). From his own research he concluded that not all

aspects of Piaget's theory can be supported cross culturally. Along with an increase in belief in immanent justice in some cultures already mentioned as contrary to the content aspect of Piaget's theory, Kohlberg,(1968) cites evidence against Piaget's concept of unilateral respect and the sacredness of moral rules for younger children. Among American children, rigidity toward game rules declines between ages five and twelve (as Piaget would predict) however, attitudes toward moral rules tend to become more rigid and reverential during the same period. Nor has evidence been found to support Piaget's contention that peer group participation is a major factor facilitating development. However, Kohlberg does cite evidence (Kohlberg,1969) to support the existence of three developmental characteristics of moral judgment posited by Piaget in a variety of Western, Oriental and aboriginal cultures: 1) Intentionality in judgment. Young children in several of these cultures judge an act as bad because of the physical consequences (many cups broken accidentally) whereas older children consider the intention to do harm (one cup broken deliberately) as making an act bad. 2) Relativism in judgment. Young children view an act as wholly right or wholly wrong. If there is a conflict of opinion, the adult view holds. Older children are aware of a possible diversity in views of right and wrong. 3) Independence of sanctions. Younger children say an act is bad because it elicits punishment. Older children say an act is bad because it harms other, violates a rule, etc.

Believing in the fundamental soundness of Piaget's approach but also wishing to account for some of its discrepancies, Kohlberg set forth his own stage theory of moral development in his dissertation in

1958, based on his interviews of 84 boys from ages 10-16. Approximately ten years later, data from follow-up research forced Kohlberg to revise his stage theory rather substantially, though he maintained his basic six stage outline. I will present the stages as he explained prior to the revision and cite some of the confirmatory findings and criticism of his theory and methodology. Then I will give some of the reasons contributing to the revision. In separate sections I will examine more closely a) how Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment relates to emotional components of the personality and b) how it relates to action.

A. Kohlberg's Original Stage Theory

Kohlberg's original stage theory posited three levels of moral development, the preconventional, conventional and post conventional. Each level was subdivided into two stages for a total of six stages. Here is how he described the levels and stages as recently as 1970 (Kohlberg,1970a):

> Definition of Moral Stages
>
> I PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL
>
> At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favours) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level comprises the following two stages:
>
> STAGE 1 Punishment and obedience orientation The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4).

STAGE 2 Instrumental relativist orientation Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms similar to those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyality, gratitude, or justice.

II CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is one not only of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. This level comprises the following two stages:

STAGE 3 Interpersonal concordance or "goodboy--nice girl" orientation Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention: "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

STAGE 4 The "law and order" orientation There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III POSTCONVENTIONAL, AUTONOMOUS OR PRINCIPLED LEVEL

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

STAGE 5 The social-contract legalistic orientation generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from

what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

STAGE 6 The universal ethical principle orientation Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

Kohlberg has followed the progress of approximately fifty of the original group of male subjects whom he first contacted in 1958 up to the present, reinterviewing them about every three years. It is from this longitudinal study that he claims the strongest evidence that his constructs are true developmental stages, that is that they are universal, structural entities which manifest themselves in an invariant sequence regardless of cultural influences (which may, however, retard or even arrest development), that each successive stage is a structural whole, qualitatively different from its predecessors in its way of solving moral issues and, finally, that each stage is a higher or "better" (i.e., hierarchical) integration of moral reasoning than its predecessors--in other words it builds on and integrates into itself the structures found at lower stages but in a better differentiated and more adequate and comprehensive way.

Kohlberg's methods of attempting to prove his contention combines both empirical (psychological) and logical (philosophic)

arguments which are complex and difficult to follow. The reader is referred to his 130 page article From Is To Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and get away with it in the study of Moral Development (Kohlberg,1971a) for a lengthy philosophic treatment and to the equally long Stage and Sequence: The cognitive developmental approach to socialization (Kohlberg,1969) for a psychological approach.

His empirically based arguments for a stage theory of moral development may be summarized this way.

a. Both cross sectional and longitudinal studies indicate that older subjects show a greater use of higher stage thinking than do younger subjects (Kohlberg,1958, 1969, Turiel,1969, Kuhn,1976). These stages do not necessarily prove that the subjects studied progressed through the stages in an invariant sequence. Intervening stages might have been skipped or passed through out of sequence. However, the findings do suggest a general progression in moral development toward better differentiated and integrated ways of thinking.

b. These general age trends have been found in as many as twelve different cultures (Kohlberg,1969, Turiel,1969, White,1975) ranging from the aboriginal Atayals of Taiwan, and village culture on the Yucatan peninsula in Mexico and Turkey to the urbanized cultures of the United States and Europe and include middle class, ghetto, delinquent and prison populations. These research findings support but of themselves do not prove the universality of stages across cultures.

c. Some longitudinal research gives stronger support to the invariant sequence of moral development. Kramer and Kohlberg,(1969)

reported on Kohlberg's original group of subjects a decade later and found indications that their development throughout that period was indeed according to the expected sequence with, however, a peculiar "regression" back to Stage 2 apparently occurring for some at college age. Later Kohlberg,(1973) presented evidence that what at first appeared to be a regression was in fact an intermediate stage ($4\frac{1}{2}$) which in all cases studied subsequently gave way to higher (Stage 5) moral thinking.

d. Comprehension tests (Turiel,1966, Rest, Turiel, Kohlberg, 1969, Turiel, 1969, Rest,1971) indicate that subjects are unlikely to skip stages because, while generally preferring statements reflecting higher reasoning than their own when presented, they were unable to comprehend or reproduce statements more than one stage above their own. In addition most subjects understand but reject moral arguments based on reasoning below their own stage. These two findings combined suggest that the stages are truly hierarchical, that is higher stages are successively more complex and adequate ways of dealing with moral situations. Subjectively individuals perceive the inadequacy of thinking below their own stage, appreciate and aspire to thinking one stage above their own but are unable to grasp the complexity of thinking representative of stages two or more above their own. Hence they are unlikely either to regress to more elementary moral thinking or to skip a stage in development.

e. Intervention studies involving support of higher stage thinking and a "plus 1 match" (confronting a subject with another's arguments one stage above his or her own) (Blatt and Kohlberg,1973),

or role-playing arguments from different stages (Turiel, 1966, 1969,) also provide supportive evidence that, at least up to stage four, upward movement is one stage at a time and permanent.

Kohlberg's research findings have been criticized from several angles. Indeed the research cited does not provide conclusive confirmation of his stage theory. Even James Rest, whose work with Turiel and Kohlberg has already been cited, admits that "in most of these studies one can find some flaw in design, or lack of controls or verification of assumptions" (Rest, 1974, p. 66). We now turn to some of the criticisms leveled by others.

B. Critical Evaluations of Kohlberg's Moral Development Theory

Several critics (Hoffman, 1970, Kurtines and Greif, 1974, Simpson, 1974) cite a study by Bandura and McDonald, (1963) as evidence against Kohlberg's contention that stage development is irreversible. Bandura and McDonald theorized that role modeling, especially by adults, combined with "the manipulation of response reinforcement contingencies" can alter children's moral orientation in whatever direction desired, forward or backward. They claimed that there was a significant tendency among the children (ages 5-11) who judged morality according to actors' intentions rather than the bare physical consequences of their deeds to reverse their judgment when models focused on the physical consequences. Other studies (Cowan, Langer, Heavenreach, and Nathanson, 1969, Le Furgy and Wolshim, 1969) found similar results (the latter study used adolescent subjects). The findings are not so clear-cut as they would initially appear, however. Bandura and McDonald used a Piagetian moral concept (objective versus

subjective responsibility) which does not necessarily distinguish structure from content (see discussion above). More importantly they do not distinguish between mimicking adult responses and genuine acquisition and retention of a moral structural capacity. They provide no evidence of any tendency among the subjects to generalize their regression from one attribute (intentionality) to others (e.g., preference for expiatory punishment over restitution). In addition, Cowan et al., (1969) found evidence that downward learning was less stable over time (two weeks) than upward learning especially when the subjects were dealing with new as opposed to retest items (a refinement missing in the Bandura and McDonald study). This latter finding creates the impression that the children were experiencing social pressure that contradicted their inner experience, pressure against which even most adults are not immune as Asch, (1955), Krech et al., (1962), Milgram, (1963) and others have amply demonstrated. However, it does not prove that their moral thinking had changed and the lack of perseverance in the apparent regression beyond a few weeks suggests the children tended to "rebound" to their original thinking once pressure was removed.

The most systematic criticism of Kohlberg's theory is that of Kurtines and Greif, (1974). The authors take a long hard look at the research adduced in support of Kohlberg and find many flaws. For example, regarding the reliability of Kohlberg's original moral development interview, they note that the only reliability estimates reported in any of the literature relate to interscorer agreement. There are no checks for internal consistency, temporal stability or

reports of using a standard error of measurement anywhere. In addition, they echo a complaint of many others that no standard scoring manual has been made available more than fifteen years after the scale began to be used. All these factors make it difficult, they claim, to replicate the research findings and cast doubt on the value of the test.

Kurtines and Greif also challenge the validity of some of the research findings. In this they are followed by Simpson,(1974). Turiel's,(1966) study comes under heaviest scrutiny because of its ambiguous statistical results. Working with 44 junior high boys, Turiel attempted to induce stage movement experimentally by exposing individuals to arguments on both sides of an issue derived either from one stage above, two stages above or one stage below the subject's own. He predicted that the groups exposed to arguments one stage above their own would shift more in that direction (+ 1) than the groups exposed to arguments one stage below their own (- 1) or two stages above (+ 2). The findings were just the opposite regarding the - 1 and + 1 groups. The - 1 groups shifted slightly more in the - 1 direction than did the + 1 groups in the + 1 direction. However, by comparing the + 1 groups with a control group which inexplicably also shifted in the - 1 direction without any experimental intervention, Turiel did find a result approaching statistical significance in the direction of his initial hypothesis. Kurtines and Greif claim, however, that Turiel's claim of a "borderline level of significance" ($t = 1.43$, $p < .10$) is not acceptable by usual standards. Moreover, no principled subjects were involved in the study. (How could one present

arguments one stage above Stage 6 or two stages above Stage 5?) Thus one third of Kohlberg's schema is not confirmed (nor disconfirmed) by the Turiel study. Thus far, Kurtines and Greif's comments seem well taken. Other criticisms seem less incisive. Their comments on the Rest,(1971) and Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg,(1969) studies in comprehension and preference do not fault the design and concede that the subjects tested (fifth, eighth and twelfth grade students) do indeed generally comprehend and reject prepared statements below their own stage of moral judgment, prefer and comprehend statements one stage above, and prefer but do not comprehend statements more than one stage above their own. However, Kurtines and Greif claim that the studies "do not show that the normal course of development...follows the six stages as defined by Kohlberg." It should be noted, however, that Rest,(1971) does not offer his findings as proof of the natural sequence of development but as a demonstration of the hierarchical nature of the stages, that is that each succeeding stage is a more adequate and comprehensive framework for making moral decisions. Admittedly this conclusion is a derivative one based on the assumption that one rejects thinking below one's own because of its perceived inadequacy, comprehends thinking one stage above because it is perceived to be more adequate and aspires to but cannot adequately comprehend still higher stages because one cannot yet deal with their complexity. Based on the evidence and logic, however, this conclusion does not appear unwarranted. It remains for someone to suggest an alternative that better explains the data, something Kurtines and Greif do not do.

Simpson,(1974) apparently following Kurtines and Greif, alludes

to an alternative explanation of the data in Hoffman,(1970). A look at the section she refers to, however, yields only the comment by Hoffman that the Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg data may "merely indicate a tendency to reject concepts at lower developmental levels which the individual has already abandoned" (Hoffman,1970 pp. 280). Taken as is, this comment ignores the fact that the focus the Rest et al., study is not only on preference but on comprehension. The subjects not only rejected arguments from stages below their own but were able to supply reasons why they did and why they preferred higher stage arguments. Moreover, Rest's 1971 study (which, of course Hoffman writing in 1970 could not have known) indicates that subjects prefer arguments above their own predominant stage. This coincides with Hoffman's earlier contention that a "more critical test of Turiel's formulation would require demonstrating that exposure to advanced moral concepts makes the child prefer them to concepts at his own present level" (Hoffman,1970, p. 280). Rest demonstrates that this, in fact, is the case.

Both the Kurtines and Greif and Simpson articles criticize Kohlberg's argument for the universality of the stages based on cross cultural data. Kurtines and Greif note that in Kohlberg's,(1969) report no mention is made of sample sizes, characteristics of the subjects, the range and standard deviations of scores, etc. Although Turiel,(1969) does provide sample sizes and minimal descriptions of the cultures studied (excepting the Turkish village which he himself investigated!) their point is well-taken. Kohlberg and colleagues have been lamentably slow in publishing studies on which they base

many of their conclusions. Simpson,(1974) simply asserts that the study of only twelve different cultures is not enough to justify Kohlberg's "sweeping assertion" that moral stages are universal phenomena. Both she and Kurtines and Greif make much of the fact that none of the subjects in Turkey and Yucatan used predominantly principled thinking thus calling into question once again the universality of the top third of the moral stages. Their contention that the universality of the moral stages cannot be definitively proved by cross-sectional, cross cultural studies appears valid up to a point. Such studies may confirm the existence of a higher percentage of higher stages among older subjects when compared with younger subjects from the same culture, however, they do not prove that individuals move sequentially from lower to higher without skipping stages or regressing to lower ones. Only longitudinal studies can demonstrate that with any certitude and in moral development the only long term longitudinal study is Kohlberg's original group of American males. However, a suasive (as opposed to a conclusive) argument can be made that since similar (though not identical) age trends can be detected in several societies and that since in one of them (American) this age trend can be accounted for most adequately by a stage theory of moral development, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that the same dynamic is at work in the others, at least until evidence to the contrary is adduced. But the issue will not be resolved until cross cultural longitudinal studies are undertaken.

Simpson's contention is that Kohlberg is culturally biased and is attempting to impose Western philosophic conceptions or morality on

other cultures. She cites the lack of principled thinking in some of the cultures studied not so much as evidence of lack of development in these cultures as of Kohlberg's own preconceptions based on a few Western philosophers. She suggests that Eastern and Western ethical philosophers are fundamentally irreconcilable and that there is no underlying structural unity. However, like so many others she appears to confuse structure and content. Take for example, the following quote (Simpson, 1974, p. 103):

> Perhaps our scientific search should be less for eternal verities and universal invariance than for alternate and creative modes of coping with truly universal and eternal problems of justice and liberty. (emphasis mine).

Kohlberg contends that it is precisely justice that underlies all morality as a universal form. It remains to be seen how Simpson can speak of "truly universal and eternal problems of justice" without betraying an underlying assumption that there are certain transcultural norms governing the relationships of all peoples of whatever culture. What standard does she use to speak of "truly universal problems of justice?" Is she imposing a Western conception of truth on a worldwide problem? Or, has she attained enough distance from her own culture to perceive rights and obligations which are owed and demanded of all peoples? If the former is true she betrays her own cultural bias. If the latter is true, it is difficult to see how her implicit viewpoint differs from Kohlberg's explicit one which regards justice as a transcultural principle.

It is not surprising that she does not perceive at least the potential similarity of Kohlberg's and her own view. Her attempt to describe Stage 6 morality is very misleading (Simpson, 1976, p. 92):

> There is an inner natural law containing a set of precepts such as the value of human life which are valid for all humanity and whose source is God or the nature of the universe.

The emphasis on law (natural or otherwise) precepts and authority are more characteristic of Stage 4 thinking than Stage 6. More importantly the perspective implicit in this description is static and self-enclosed. There is no awareness of the process (first evidenced in Stage 5 thinking) whereby just relationships are established. According to the perspective presented by Simpson, the natural law or God ordains that human life is valuable and that humans are bound to acknowledge the fact emanating from an authoritative source. According to Kohlberg, Stage 6 persons' thinking differs from this perspective at least three ways: 1) it acknowledges the value of human life as intuitively apparent rather than appealing to an extrinsic authority or law to validate its worth and 2) it recognizes that morality involves a process of mediating this and other competing values in a just or fair way, e.g., how does one preserve the value of life and the value of truthfulness in a situation where telling the truth might cost someone their life but where not telling the truth might lead to a total break in communication and trust in a community? 3) To do this Stage 6 thinking assumes a perspective outside the relationship of authority to subordinates and perceives how this and other relationships within human society fulfill or contradict principles of justice.

Other more benign critics from within the cognitive developmental fold, while basically affirming the value of Kohlberg's research, hint that he may exhibit some unconscious biases.

Rest, (1974, p. 69) mentions the strongly individualistic orientation of Stage 6 as opposed to a more socially supportive orientation and suggests that this may derive from Kohlberg's non-academic experience.

> Kohlberg began his own adult life involved in action in which the central moral question was under what conditions it is right to disobey recognized authorities and to commit illegal acts. In his late teens at the end of World War II, Kohlberg was involved in smuggling Jews into Palestine on a freighter disguised as a banana boat. Unlike the Exodus movie and Paul Newman, the boat was captured, and the whole crew, including Kohlberg and the passengers spent some time in a British concentration camp on Cypress. Here he says he had some time to think about basic questions. In his formulation of the higher stages of morality as well as in the set of hypothetical moral dilemmas used in his research, the major theme is how moral man can protect or promote human life and dignity when laws or authority would compromise it. (emphasis mine).

Haan, Stroud and Holstein, (1973) relying on their study of counter culture people in San Francisco, see another possible bias. Kohlberg commonly speaks of "hippie culture" as being almost prototypically Stage 3, i.e., based on an empathic interpersonal concordance and support, much like an extended family, with little regard for larger societal issues. The investigators offer an example of a counter culture response to the Heinz dilemma (whether a man should steal an expensive drug to save his wife's life) which may, at first glance, appear to be Stage 3. Although the authors do not expressly say so, in my opinion the latter part of the response reveals a perspective on human relationships and society which is post conventional. Replying to the question: is Heinz right or wrong in stealing the drug, the respondent says: "He's neither right or wrong. It's not a question of right or wrong. He felt like he was compelled....If his background has led him to this action, then he should be true to

himself. A companionate attitude is necessary to do the right."

Up to this point, the reply seems to be Stage 3, that is moral obligation derives from feelings for the person involved, although, even here, there is some evidence of a perspective not ordinarily available at Stage 3, an ability to philosophize, to generalize beyond the specific situation. The concluding part of his answer, however, demonstrates that the respondent has a higher perspective. "Companionship comes before duty, that is companionship to everyone...his feeling toward his wife shouldn't have any bearing on the issue. He should do it because of compassion for everyone" (Haan et al., p. 611, emphasis mine).

The respondent appears to understand the concept of duty (typically Stage 4) and rejects it in favor of "companionship". He defines companionship not in terms of a small coterie of like-minded relations or friends (Stage 3) but sees it as a quality one should exhibit toward everyone. He seems to be speaking of a universal affective dimension of morality which could correspond to Kohlberg's more cognitive conception of justice.

Haan et al., (p. 611) then offer the observation:

> Since part of the fundamental developmental thrust of Kohlberg's conceptualization is toward greater abstraction, objectivity and rationality, it is not surprising that the moral reasoning of persons who explicitly reject these criteria for making moral decisions would be designated as "immature" by the Kohlberg system. More generally, the theory may appreciate moral development within societies organized on rational-legal bases but inadequately represent it when the fundamental organizational principles are communal and are more immediately experienced by the citizen.

Taken together, Rest's and Haan et al.,'s observations serve as a caution that Kohlberg himself may not have been able to

distinguish clearly between structure and content in his own theory and may have been deceived by some expression typical of one stage of development so that he missed the underlying thought structure which lent them a very different cast.

The criticisms discussed so far have concentrated for the most part on the adequacy of Kohlberg's cognitive theory of moral development. I have not reviewed either Kohlberg's opinion or the critics responses to two other vitally important aspects of moral development theory, 1) the relationship of moral thinking to moral action and 2) the relationship of affective and motivational aspects of personality to morality.

C. Moral Thinking and Moral Action

Philosophically Kohlberg considers himself something of a Platonist regarding moral development (Kohlberg,1970b). He believes that virtue is essentially one and is always the same ideal form, justice. And he asserts that virtue is knowledge of the good. "He who knows the good chooses the good" (Kohlberg,1970, p. 58). Psychologically this second point is one of his most controversial contentions. Psychoanalytic, behaviorist and learning theorists, whatever their other differences, all assert that the influence of knowledge or reason on moral behavior is relatively minor when compared with either social and environmental influences or unconscious motivations.

Nevertheless several studies have been undertaken by Kohlberg and others to support his contention that moral thinking is the single most important determinant of moral action. Let us now review several of these studies.

1. Cheating and Moral Judgment. Kohlberg frequently cites the well-known Hartshorne and May studies, (1928-1930) as evidence that what he calls "The bag of virtues" approach to morality is empirically unverifiable. This approach is variously described as training children, through reward, reinforcement, modeling, shaming, love withdrawal, etc., to exhibit socially acceptable behavior. Society or family determines what that behavior is to be and forms or shapes the child's behavior to conform to the pre-determined standards. Naturally the elicited behavior varies from society to society. Each society, or institution within a given society, has its own list or "bag" of desired behaviors. One of the most commonly reinforced "virtues" in a competitive society such as our own is behavioral honesty i.e., not cheating or not cooperating with another in achieving a common goal in a situation defined as individually competitive. The Hartshorne and May studies revealed that there does not appear to be two groups of people, cheaters and non cheaters, one of which can generally be counted on not to cheat in most situations, and the other which will probably cheat given the opportunity. Instead, behaviorally speaking, cheating appears to be a random variable "distributed", as Kohlberg says, "in a bell curve fashion around a level of moderate cheating" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 227). If a person cheats in one situation there is no way to predict from that fact whether or not he or she will cheat in another. Kohlberg asserts, however, that one can predict with some accuracy how someone will behave (given a knowledge of the situational variables) if one knows the level of moral thinking. He cites his own research (Kohlberg, 1958) and studies by Krebs, (1967) and

Schwartz, Feldman, Brown and Heingartner, (1969) to support his contention. In his own (1958) work the product moment correlation between maturity of moral judgment scores and teachers' ratings of the subjects' conscience as evidenced in conformity to rules was .46. Presumably one should conclude from that that the higher one's moral maturity score, the less likely one is to cheat or violate other socially defined norms. The Schwartz et al., study (cited by Kohlberg, 1971 as Brown, Feldman, Schwartz and Heingartner) divided 35 undergraduates into two moral judgment levels using a short form of Kohlberg's moral judgment test as a discriminator. Subsequently they administered a cheating test to them. Only one of the nine principled subjects cheated against about one half of the conventional subjects. Krebs, (1967) in a study of 120 sixth grade children found that 20% of principled subjects cheated versus 67% of those at lower stages.

While suggestive, these studies are by no means conclusive. Krebs' findings particularly are questionable. It seems hard to believe that <u>any</u> sixth grade children have achieved a principled level of morality. Nor does it even seem likely that 25% of Schwartz et al.,'s undergraduate population scored at the principled level. One must bear in mind that all these studies were conducted at a time when Kohlberg had not adequately distinguished between structure and content (Kohlberg,1973). At best all one can claim for them then, is that they support a distinction between high and low ends of the moral development scale but offer no such predictive validity for individual levels, to say nothing of stages.

2. Delinquency and Moral Judgment. Fodor, (1972) compared 40 delinquent and 40 non delinquent adolescent boys who were matched for race, age and verbal intelligence on the Kohlberg scale of moral development. He found that while both groups' modal score was Stage 3, using a weighted score system that compares scores within a given stage, the non delinquent boys scored significantly higher ($p < .001$ two tailed test) than the delinquent boys. Ruma and Mosher (1967) found that Stage 3 delinquent boys experienced more measurable guilt than those with lower scores. These findings suggest that a certain amount of internalization of guilt or self-criticism evolves at about Stage 3 and that this may be related to one's conformity to societal laws. This supports Kohlberg's contention that the transition from the pre-conventional to the conventional level is a critical one and that those who do not make the transition remain relatively unsocialized. However, more studies would have to be made to confirm this.

Kohlberg and staff have become involved in a prison experiment with adults (partially reported in Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey, 1972) in which they analyzed the "moral atmosphere" of the prison, that is on what level justice was administered on a day-to-day basis. They found that the prison operated partly with Stage 4 fixed rule standards and partly by Stage 2 manipulations of rules by the staff. Inmates, however, perceived the administration of justice to be at Stages 1 and 2. Those inmates who were capable of conventional thinking when considering moral dilemmas set outside the prison, reverted to pre-conventional thinking when asked what one should do in analagous situation set within the prison.

These findings suggest that any attempts to raise the level of moral judgment in the hope of reforming law violators will have to contend with the human moral environment and specifically with the way justice is administered on a concrete, day-to-day basis. Persons who are deprived of their right to assume responsibility for their own actions and to work them out in relation to others in a fairly administered structure cannot be expected to progress very far morally. If anything, however, it diminishes Kohlberg's earlier contention that the moral thinking of the individual is a prime determinant of his or her behavior and reemphasizes the impact of environment on the level of moral development one achieves.

3. Political Action and Moral Judgment. Haan, Smith and Block, (1968) conducted a study of political civil disobedience among students at the University of California at Berkeley and at San Francisco State College. The Berkeley students were faced with deciding whether or not to sit-in at the Administration Building in the name of political freedom on campus. The researchers administered Kohlberg's moral judgment interview to 200 students. They found that 75% of the men and 86% of the women who were rated Stage 6 were arrested for taking part in the sit-in. Only about 10% of the conventional (Stages 3 and 4) men and women chose to sit-in.

Table: Arrested in the Free Speech Movement Sit-in at Berkeley

Moral Stage		2	3	4	5	6
Men	%	60	18	6	41	75
	N	10	22	50	27	8
Women	%	33	9	12	57	86
	N	3	32	41	14	7

In his own commentary on the Haan et al., study, Kohlberg suggests that for the Stage 6 persons and the Stage 3 and 4 persons the situation was morally clear-cut. The Stage 6 people believed that their individual rights were being violated and therefore protested. The Stage 3 and 4 people perceived the sit-in as a clear violation of rules established by legitimate authority and as "good citizens" would have no part of it. According to Haan et al., the minority of conventional individuals who did in fact sit-in asserted that "the University of California administrators had failed in their role of authorities--as good authorities for Stage 3 and as actual violators of proper legal understanding for Stage 4" (Haan et al., 1968, p. 198).

Stage 5 subjects were almost evenly divided between sitting-in and not sitting-in. Again, according to Kohlberg, their contractual orientation provided no clear-cut decision. Depending on how they perceived the facts they could argue either that as students they implicitly had agreed to abide by the school rules when they were admitted to the university and were therefore contractually bound to obey them or, on the other hand, that the university had

violated its end of the contract and hence all bets were off.

Most interestingly, almost as great a percentage of Stage 2 instrumental relativist men chose to sit-in as Stage 6 (60% versus 75%.) This confounding datum has been commented on by Kurtines and Greif, (1974) as indicating that Kohlberg's stages are not good discriminators of action. What good is a scale when people who score near the bottom and at the top act morally the same way? Kohlberg's reply (Kohlberg,1971, p. 228) (though not, to my knowledge, made directly to Kurtines and Greif) is that it is impossible to determine the morality of an action simply by observing what someone <u>does</u>.

> Edmund Wilson (and Thoreau) failed to pay income taxes as a 'matter of conscience' while millions of their fellow citizens fail to do so for reasons of 'expedience'. The behaviors are the same, and no psychologist can tell them apart. There simply is no valid psychological definition of moral behavior, in the sense that no observation and categorization of behavior 'from outside', or 'behavioristically', can define its moral status in any psychologically valid sense....Before we can know anything about...behavior ...we must first know what a man's moral judgments or principles are.

On a much more sophisticated level, many psychologists appear to make the same mistake as some of the children whom Piaget interviewed. They believe morality is an external, "objective" fact. But morality proceeds from the heart and the mind. Piaget's and Kohlberg's contribution to psychology is that they have reestablished the psychological validity of what otherwise were considered unempirical epiphenomena; the inner workings of the human mind as human beings grapple with their responsibility as a beings in the world. To preserve a proper balance one can ignore neither the inner processes nor the actions emanating from them. While it is true that the "road

to hell is paved with good intentions" and that no amount of good will or elegant thinking will make up for a Hamletesque failure to act, it is equally true that unreflective action, even in apparent conformity to an established moral code, can have equally hellish consequences as recent adventures in unlimited warfare demonstrate all too well.

Kurtines and Greif insist on a theory that discriminates moral from immoral behavior but no theory can separate moral behavior from the inner thoughts, intentions and motivations which engender it, not because of a deficiency in theory but because neither "moral" nor "immoral" has any meaning when these inner processes are ignored.

How then does one explain the odd fact that in the Free Speech Movement Stage 6 "principled" thinkers found themselves allied with a high percentage of Stage 2 "instrumental relativists"? Initially Kohlberg (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) explained that a regression seemed to occur among about 20% of the brighter college students in his longitudinal study who, after exhibiting a mixture Stage 4 and Stage 5 thinking in late high school, in college reverted to a Stage 2 hedonistic relativism "jazzed up with some philosophic and socio-political jargon." This seemed to be a temporary regression, similar to Erikson's "regression in service of the ego," because later the same individuals returned to Stage 4 and Stage 5 reasoning. It is quite conceivable that students experiencing the disequilibrium of this regression might in fact ally themselves with a presumably idealistic movement while instrumentally serving their own needs. The outcome would in fact be a rather embarrassing coalition of principled with self-seeking protesters.

However well this explains the Berkeley data, evidence of any form of regression is troublesome to a theory which is based on an invariant and irreversible sequence. In fact it has led Kohlberg to dramatically revise his theory and scoring system. He now asserts (Kohlberg,1973) that 1) there was no structural regression and 2) Stages 5 and 6 (principled thinking) are adult stages found no earlier than age 23 in his longitudinal sample. The subjects who had apparently retrogressed from a mixture of Stage 4 and 5 thought in fact were at an intermediate or transitional stage between Stages 4 and 5 which Kohlberg calls $4\frac{1}{2}$. These subjects define morality in Stage 4 terms only to reject it. They exhibit a form of "extreme ethical relativism" i.e., asserting that the "morally right" is relative to a person's needs or wishes and has no other validity than that. There is in their opinion no appeal to an objective standard beyond their subjective needs or wishes. Correlatively they manifest an ethical egoism or individualism by asserting that the actor's viewpoint is the "natural" one, independent of and, by implication taking precedence over society's.

The notions of ethical relativism and egoism held by Stage $4\frac{1}{2}$ subjects are quite different from authentic Stage 2 thinking. First $4\frac{1}{2}$ thinking understands but rejects arguments based on Stage 4 thinking, while Stage 2 thinking does not. A Stage 2 person, for example, cannot distinguish need or wish from duty. A Stage $4\frac{1}{2}$ person has a concept of dutiful choice but denies its validity. Moreover, at $4\frac{1}{2}$ a person can deal with moral theory, that is, he or she can assume a viewpoint outside of a given society to weigh the

moral validity of laws and rules. As mentioned, a Stage 2 person does not yet grasp the function of society beyond its being a mechanism for the gratification of concrete individual appetites.

Now Kohlberg asserts that what was once scored as Stage 5 thinking was actually a sophisticated Stage 4 thinking now called 4B (Kohlberg,1973, p. 31).

> In summary, our longitudinal data now suggests that Stage 5 is a stage reached in adulthood, not in adolescence. With regard to Stage 6, something similar is to be said. Thinking we labeled Stage 6 in high school was mis-classified. No longitudinal subject in high school had been predominantly Stage 6, nor has any become predominantly Stage 6 by the age of thirty, either. (Although we will not predict that none will reach Stage 6.) Essentially, the material we were scoring as Stage 6 was another form of sophisticated Stage 4 thought, one which appealed to "conscience" and "moral law" instead of "to the will of the majority" and "the welfare of the greatest good."

As mentioned earlier this change in theory and scoring makes it extremely difficult to evaluate research conducted using the old methods. Were Haan, Smith and Block's student protesters really at Stage 6 or were they sophisticated 4B's? And if so, how is their thinking distinguished structurally from their non-protesting brethren? Only a thorough re-analysis of the data will provide an answer to these and many related questions. Kohlberg's change of theory and scoring has made necessary an entire new round of research to back up his claim that moral judgment is the key to moral education and moral action. Rest, (1974) has suggested that moral development research has entered a third phase. The first phase was Piaget's pioneering work published in 1932. The second phase was Kohlberg's work commencing in 1958 and ending about 1969. The third phase began about 1970 with Kohlberg's re-evaluation just reviewed. This third

phase poses many questions and provides few answers. Rest proposes a few of them:

> What kind of variable is moral judgment? How can one put much confidence in what people say when there often seems to be such a discrepancy in what they do?
>
> How is one stage "better" than another? By what criteria are higher stages said to be more advanced than lower stages?
>
> How can one know whether stages of moral development even exist? How useful is it to study moral judgment in terms of stages?
>
> Is morality really as cerebral and intellectual as the cognitive developmental approach suggests? What is the relation between moral cognitions and affect?
>
> How is moral judgment related to actual, real life behavior?

Up to this point I have attempted to review the research related to the last question. I will conclude this rather long section with a look at the laboratory research of Stanley Milgram on obedience which provides chilling evidence of the need for something better than conventional morality in our post conventional age.

In the final section of this chapter I will explore Rest's penultimate question about cognition and affect in moral development. Research in this area is sparse. My explorations will be more suggestive and based on clinical data and intuition which I hope will stimulate more systematic investigation.

4. Obedience and Moral Judgment. In addition to the Haan et al., study, Kohlberg frequently cites the Milgram experiments as confirmation of his hypothesis that moral judgment is prime determinant of moral action. Initially reported on in 1963 (Milgram,1963) a fuller exposition of the experiment has more recently been published

(Milgram,1974). As it was initially set up and in its many subsequent variations, the experiment was designed to see to what extent an ordinary person would obey an apparently legitimate authority by inflicting pain on an innocent victim. Specifically, subjects were recruited from the general population of a small New England city to take part in a "learning experiment" which apparently involved pairing words from memory. One person (a confederate of the experimenter) was designated as "learner" and the other (always a naive subject chosen by a rigged drawing) as "teacher". Milgram,(1974) explains what follows:

> The experimenter explains that the study is concerned with the effects of punishment on learning. The learner is conducted into a room, seated in a chair, his arms strapped to prevent excessive movement, and an electrode attached to his wrist. He is told that he is to learn a list of word pairs; whenever he makes an error, he will receive shocks of increasing intensity.
>
> The real focus of the experiment is the teacher. After watching the learner being strapped into place, he is taken into the main experimental room and seated before an impressive shock generator. Its main feature is a horizontal line of thirty switches, ranging from 15 volts to 450 volts, in 15-volt increments. There are also verbal designations which range from SLIGHT SHOCK to DANGER-SEVERE SHOCK. The teacher is told that he is to administer the learning test to the man in the other room. When the man responds correctly, the teacher moves on to the next item; when the man gives an incorrect answer, the teacher is to give him an electric shock. He is to start at the lowest shock level (15 volts) and to increase the level each time the man makes an error, going through 30 volts, 45 volts, and so on.

In fact no shocks were administered except for a mild one given to the "teacher" to convince him that the "shock generator" actually worked. The experimental paraphernalia and the acting of the confederate was so realistic, however, that virtually no subject doubted that he was in reality administering a series of increasingly painful

shocks to a helpless "victim" strapped into a chair.

Because the learning experiment is rigged from the start, the learner makes "mistakes" in a predetermined pattern and apparently receives increasingly more severe shocks. At 75 volts he grunts. At 120 volts he complains aloud; at 150 he demands to be released from the experiment. From then on he shouts, pounds and complains about a weak heart. At 285 volts he lets out an agonized scream and at 330 volts he is not heard from at all, neither do his answers appear in the signal box.

Meanwhile the "teacher" (the actual subject of the experiment) looks to the experimenter for guidance and is encouraged to continue. The experimenter uses several verbal formulas in prearranged sequence, the strongest being "You have no choice, you must go on" and "assures" the teacher that "Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage."

Milgram found that under the conditions described 62.5% (26 of 40) of the subjects continued with the experiment to the very end, administering, they thought, shocks of up to 450 volts. None of the subjects refused to participate in the experiment. Only six subjects (12.5%) quit at the time the victim demanded to be released.

The results were so dismally astounding that Milgram tried several variations including one during which, to administer the shock, the subject was required physically to press the victim's arm onto the shock plate from the 150 volt level on. In this "touch-proximity" circumstance 42.5% quit at the point where physical force was demanded of them. Nevertheless, the majority continued with the victim

protesting and screaming right beside them and 30% persisted to the very end of the experiment.

Kohlberg,(1969) reports that he administered moral judgment interviews to the participants in one of Milgram's pilot experiments using 34 Yale undergraduates. He found that 75% (6 out of 8) of subjects he scored at Stage 6 refused to complete the experiment (though even they must have participated by giving shocks at lower voltage levels since Milgram reports that no one ever refused to participate in the experiment once it was explained). Only 13% of those at lower stages (including Stage 5) quit. His finding is suggestive but little more than that because the information he provides is so scanty and, as we now know, he used his old scoring system at that time (1963 ?) so that even his resistant Stage 6 subjects might now be classified as 4B. A re-analysis of and more extensive publication of his data related to Milgram's study would be extremely helpful but, to my knowledge, has not been forthcoming.

Milgram himself, (1974, p. 205) reports some "weak" findings in the following areas:

> Republicans and Democrats were not significantly different in obedience levels; Catholics were more obedient than Jews or Protestants. The better educated were more defiant than the less well educated. Those in the moral professions of law, medicine and teaching showed greater defiance than those in more technical professions such as engineering and physical science. The longer one's military service, the more obedience--except that former officers were less obedient than those who served as enlisted men, regardless of length of service.

Nevertheless Milgram wonders "at how few correlates there were of obedience and disobedience and how weakly they are related to observed behavior" (p. 205).

It seems premature, at any rate, to assert that the level of moral judgment alone determines how one would act in a given situation. Milgram alludes to other factors (several of which will shortly be considered) which he hypothesizes exerted virtually irresistable pressure on most individuals to violate their own sense of morality or moral judgment. He concludes from the moderate to high level of stress the majority of subjects experienced when administering the shocks that by their own actions they were contradicting some inner sense of right and wrong. The ensuing conflict appears to have been "between the deeply ingrained disposition not to harm others and the equally compelling tendency to obey others who are in authority" (Milgram, 1974, p. 42-43).

However, it could be argued just as validly that it was not a conflict between an inner moral code and external pressure that produced the stress so much as it was placing individuals in a situation that was simply unresolvable from the level of moral judgment at which they operated. "Not harming others" and "respecting and obeying authority" are both conventional moral clichés--content-expressions which suggest the existence of an underlying conventional moral structure. "Not harming others" would be more characteristic of a Stage 3 orientation (personal concordance) at which stage "niceness" and "caring for others" is stressed; "respecting and obeying authority" suggests a Stage 4 (authority maintaining set). If the majority of persons participating in the Milgram experiments were at the conventional level (as seems likely since most Americans score at that level), they would very likely experience considerable stress because

they would be unable to resolve the competing claims of the two injunctions. It also seems likely that, both because of their cognitive confusion and stress and their conventional orientation, they would obey an authority who seems to know what he is talking about and calmly urges them to continue, as, in fact, was the case.

There are some other factors, however, which do not appear to be purely structural but which nevertheless seemed pivotal in this particular set of experiments. As described by Milgram, they appear to have both psychological and social components. Among these are:

1. Politeness - based on anticipating feeling awkward if one were to withdraw from the experiment.
2. Narrowing of the cognitive field - individuals focused their attention on the technical aspects of the task, e.g., articulating the word pairs precisely, pressing the switches with great care, and apparently avoided concerning themselves about the goals or morality of the experiment itself.
3. Seeing oneself as not responsible - persons saw themselves as not morally accountable because they were agents of an external authority.
4. Shift in moral sense - morality now is defined not as an adherence to an internalized code or "principles" but as how well one lives up to the expectations authority has of a person.
5. Counteranthropomorphism - a tendency to ignore the human beings in the experiment while believing that the experimental

process has a validity of its own superior to the people who conceived it or those who suffer from it. "The Experiment" acquires an impersonal momentum of its own. "It's got to go on. It's got to go on," one subject repeated without apparently questioning why.

6. Post factum devaluation of the victim - frequently after "shocking" the "learner" subjects would make such comments as "he was stupid and stubborn and deserved to get shocked."
7. Intellectual resistance - some subjects were completely convinced that they were acting immorally but consoled themselves that, at least within, they were "on the side of the angels."
8. Fragmentation of the human action - in a variation of the experiment the naive subject's responsibility was merely to read off the word pairs while someone else administered the "shocks." In this instance 37 of 40 adults (93%) continued to the highest shock level on the generator while excusing their behavior by saying the responsibility belonged to the person who pulled the switch.

Some of these factors may be explained as defense mechanisms of people who were acting in bad faith. For example, in order to cooperate in the experiment one would have to suppress any fellow-feeling for the victim and this could be accomplished by attending to the technical details, focusing on the experimenter's wishes, feeling helpless, etc. But this leaves unsolved the question why did they feel constrained to act in bad faith in the first place? They were

not physically forced nor were they threatened in any way. It appears that authority, especially when represented in person, for the vast majority of people has a remarkably compelling quality quite apart from any possible sanctions. This seems particularly true in a complicated social network such as our own which depends on the coordination of a vast number of individual enterprises.

Kohlberg's explanation that individuals do not resist a malevolent authority because they can not rationally justify a defiant stance probably gets at some of the truth. The ability to think for oneself is the quality of an autonomous person. But thinking and acting in the face of social pressure to the contrary seems to require self-reliance and courage possessed by few people. And these are not purely rational factors but belong to the fuzzy domain of the "affective" to which I now turn.

D. Moral Judgment and Moral Emotion

Both Piaget and Kohlberg have asserted that the cognitive developmental approach by no means ignores the role played by emotion or affect in human development. They view the development of the affective life as structurally parallel to cognitive development. Thus Piaget, (1968, p. 15) writes:

> There is a constant parallel between the affective and intellectual life throughout childhood and adolescence. This statement will seem surprising only if one attempts to dichotomize the life of the mind into emotions and thoughts....In reality, the element to which we most constantly turn in the analysis of mental life is "behavior" itself....All behavior presupposes instruments and a technique: movements and intelligence. But all behavior also implies motives and final values (goals): the sentiments. Thus affectivity and intelligence are indissociable and constitute the two complementary aspects of all human behavior.

Kohlberg makes a similar assertion when he writes: "Both Piaget's and our position...is not the position that cognition determines affect and behavior, but that the development of cognition and the development of affect have a common structural base" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 389). Elsewhere Kohlberg emphasizes the importance of the way one perceives and responds to experience as the crucial factor which unites our cognitive and affective dispositions. "Because of its emphasis on ways of perceiving and responding to experience, cognitive-developmental theory discards the traditional dichotomy of social versus intellectual development. Rather, cognitive and affective development are parallel aspects of the structural transformation which takes place in development" (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972, p. 457).

One might conclude from quotes such as these that Kohlberg is striving for an integrative theoretical approach which relates cognition and affect in a mutually complementary way. Indeed, in his Stage and Sequence article, (1969), he depicts schematically how the moral emotion "guilt" undergoes successive differentiations through the stages just as more cognitive elements, such as "orientation to intentions and consequences" do. At the same time, however, he reveals a bias in favor of the cognitive that appears, at least partially, to contradict his efforts to achieve a balance between cognition and affect. Thus he states that the cognitive-developmental theory "emphasizes that the core of development is not the unfolding of instincts, emotions, or sensorimotor patterns of thinking but instead is cognitive change in distinctively human, general patterns

of thinking about the self and the world. The child's relation to his social environment is cognitive; it involves thought and symbolic interaction" (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972, p. 457). And again: "While motives and affect are involved in moral development, the development of these motives and affects is largely mediated by changes in thought patterns" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 390). He leaves little doubt that for him cognition is the primary determinant of moral development and he seems to have abandoned his earlier attempts to work out the implications of a structurally integrated theory of cognition and affect. In a sense one cannot blame him, for the word "affect" embraces an immense and murky area of human experience which resist easy formulations and appears virtually impervious to scientific analysis.

Kohlberg's treatment of guilt, alluded to above, illustrates some of the limitations of his approach. He considers guilt an equivocal term which at one level could mean fear of punishment, at another the experience of shame in the sight of others over a violated norm, and still another a condemnatory self-judgment over the violation of a self-chosen, ethical principle. But again he displays some ambivalence; for, while, on the one hand, he differentiates the experience of guilt according to one's level of moral development, on the other, he reduces the <u>emotional</u> experience, bereft of its cognitive determinants, to a common physiological sensation. "In some sense, the feeling in the pit of one's stomach is the same whether it is dread of external events or dread of one's own self-judgment. The difference between the two is that in one case the bad feeling is interpreted by the child as fear of external sanctioning forces while

in the other case, it is interpreted by the child as produced by the self's own moral judgments" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 392).

If anyone were to spend a few moments, not interpreting their experience of reality but simply living it, they would quickly realize that their experiences of fear, shame and self-condemnation are quite different, even apart from the significance psychologists may ascribe to these emotions. Even physiologically they are not reducible to a "feeling in the pit of one's stomach." Each is a remarkably subtle and differentiated experience involving a whole complex of thoughts and feelings. Shame, for example, may include that "feeling in the pit of one's stomach" commonly associated with fear but it also includes a red and burning face, the effect of embarrassment over being discovered by another to be acting at variance with socially approved norms. At a deeper level, it may also include a feeling of rage or outrage that another (or part of oneself) is subjecting oneself to judgment and humiliation. Recognition of one's failure to live out a self-chosen ethical principle may include fear and shame as described above, and in addition it may include elements of anger at oneself for failing to live out one's ideals and contrition or sadness over one's failure. It could also include a re-affirmation of one's basic sense of goodness and of the ethical principle one espouses.

These are but a few, and by no means exhaustive, possible descriptions of the experiences summarized under the symbol "guilt," and indicate that the investigation of "moral guilt" has scarcely begun.

The failure of the cognitive developmental school to come up

with a truly balanced theory integrating cognition and affect may be traceable to fundamental epistemological oversight on the part of its proponents. Kestenbaum, (1974) in an article entitled "On a certain blindness in Jean Piaget" suggests that the great Swiss psychologist does not pay enough attention to a phenomenological description of human mental activity. Instead, asserts Kestenbaum, Piaget limits himself to just one aspect of human consciousness namely the child's attempt to understand one or other aspect of its experience. The child, however, experiences vastly more than what falls under the focus of its immediate attention. Kestenbaum, (1974, p. 83) quotes John Dewey in this regard:

> The greater part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind--of operative meanings--is enormously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is contextual, persistent; consciousness is focal, transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial, a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is process, a series of here and nows.

In terms of Gestalt psychology, the phenomenological field of consciousness consists of a small focus of attention surrounded by a vast field of general awareness. Just as the eye focuses on one point at a time but simultaneously embraces a broad perspective of diffuse awareness, so human consciousness in general concentrates on but one tiny aspect at a time out of a huge potential. Both eye and mind range from one point to another so that the figure/ground relationship constantly shifts in a dynamic interchange; what is ground at one moment becomes figure in the next only to recede into ground at a third. Out of the ground emerges percepts, feelings, memories, fantasies, thoughts, etc., and it is from these that we construct the

models of our world. In comparison to the phenomenological, lived-world, the models we construct to understand our world are derivative and formal. They are simplified constructs which more or less accurately summarize a complex array of experience. The constructs are crucial to human knowledge but should not be confused with the infinitely richer and more complex world from which they are derived. Kestenbaum contends that Piaget does not always observe the distinction between the child's relatively narrow, formal construction of reality (a derivation from the lived-world) and its variegated experience of the lived-world with all its affective overtones.

Kohlberg seems guilty of a similar error. The moral stages which he has developed are constructs or models for understanding reality. Designed as they are to express common patterns emerging from human experience, they inevitably simplify that experience for the sake of coherence. One makes a fundamental error if one confuses the stage-models with the reality of experience itself. A person who struggles with a real-life moral decision experiences much more physically, emotionally, and socially than can be expressed by assigning him or her a stage rating no matter how nuanced the thinking that went into the stage theory. For the stage theory to continue to be useful, researchers must continually return, not to previous formulations or theories, but to the moral experience itself in all its complexity. As long as Kohlberg continues to rely only on a structured moral interview, the main purpose of which is to detect underlying thought patterns, he will continue to give undue weight to the cognitive aspects of morality. In my opinion, to offset that bias,

a more phenomenological approach which in the beginning will be content to describe on several levels (physical, intellectual, emotional, etc.) and as exhaustively as possible the moral experience itself without feeling constrained to fit it to a procrustean bed of theory. Only after the experience has been thoroughly described should the second step of looking for commonalities and patterns be undertaken.

A comprehensive theory of moral development synthesizing thinking, feeling and action has yet to emerge partially, I suspect, because of the sectarianism of the various psychological approaches. At this point I will attempt to compare the cognitive developmental approach with a theory of moral development derived from the analytical psychology of C. G. Jung. Although at first glance the two approaches seem and, in many respects, are vastly different, I believe they are complementary approaches to the problem. Each has the potential to compensate for the deficiencies of the other and, taken together, to provide a better balance between cognition and affect.

Erich Neumann, a follower of Jung, some years ago published a book entitled Depth Psychology and the New Ethic, (Neumann, 1969) which has been translated into English only relatively recently. In the book Neumann persues a theme which is reminiscent of Kohlberg, namely that a "collective", or in Kohlberg's terminology, a "conventional" ethic based on adherence to a prescriptive code defining one's duty in every situation is not only inadequate in today's world but dangerous. No code-morality can hope to keep up with the

variety and complexity of moral decisions demanded of us today. Neumann claims that among a few a "new ethic" is emerging which seeks to integrate not only our ego consciousness (which includes moral judgments) but our unconscious motivations as well. This new ethic emphasizes individual responsibility, reminiscent of Kohlberg's principled moral person who sometimes acts counter to group norms and pressure, but orients to the good of society as a whole. Although he has not worked out the implications for social justice in anything like the detail Kohlberg has, Neumann obviously has the good of society, or the "collective," in mind. The new ethic "does not merely take into account the ethical situation of the individual, but also considers the effect which the individual's attitude will have on the collective" (Neumann, 1969, p. 92).

Neumann differs from Kohlberg in his analysis of how an integrated ethical awareness develops. The main dynamic according to Kohlberg is the progressive development of social role-taking ability. The child, and eventually the adult, becomes increasingly sophisticated in its ability to view a moral dilemma from the several viewpoints of the individuals involved. The pre conventional viewpoint tends to be egoistic and to see the other only in terms of his or her relationship to the self. The self-gratifying role-taking perspective of a Stage 2 person is colloquially described by Kohlberg as "you scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours." The conventional viewpoint orients to family and social roles, Stage 3 focusing more on empathetic, felt relationships of self and others and Stage 4 on a more unimpassioned social perspective which views self and others in terms of their "position"

in society. It is only at the principled level that people can gain a perspective "outside" society and view not only the complex role taking within a given society but how society itself functions on behalf or contrary to the needs and purposes of the human persons who constitute it. It is the "distance" provided by this perspective which, according to Kohlberg, enables individuals to challenge, change and sometimes contravene societal rules and laws.

As we have seen, however, the perspective of principled thinking alone does not seem to assure principled moral action. Kohlberg himself seems to acknowledge that. In his longitudinal study (Kohlberg, 1973),he found that the few adults who had thus far demonstrated predominantly Stage 5 thinking had enjoyed not only a "moratorium" in college to broaden their awareness of perspectives different from their own but also had been faced with affectively weighted social tasks which entailed making moral decisions insoluble at the conventional level involving sustained responsibility, especially for others. Milgram's experiments and Lifton's, (1973) investigation of Vietnam atrocities also lend weight to the power of affect to influence action even in contradiction of moral judgment.

Neumann, writing as he did more than a decade before Kohlberg's dissertation was completed, neither asserts nor denies the efficacy of role-taking. He does, however, insist that modern ethical thought pays insufficient attention to the influence of unconscious motivational factors on moral action. Although he

comments mainly on the motivational or affective components of morality his "Stages"[1] of moral development roughly parallel Kohlberg's and complement the latter's more cognitive orientation. Neumann's first "Stage" he calls the Stage of primal unity and roughly corresponds to Kohlberg's premoral and Stage 1 morality (Stages 0, 1.) At this "Stage", "there is no individual or conscious ethical responsibility" (Neumann, p. 60). Primitive urges and drives predominate as the ego is barely differentiated from the unconscious. Group responsibility is paramount. Any member of a family or tribe is considered responsible for the misconduct of one individual. Ethical imperatives, such as they are, derive from the Founding Individual who received them as some form of revelation and are surrounded by religious taboo. Morality is sanctioned by a superior power with supernatural overtones.

Neumann does not make the distinction Kohlberg does between Stages 1 and 2 and in this his theory is somewhat deficient. Kohlberg's Stage 2 sees the emergence into awareness of the individuals' power of self-gratification through manipulation of the environment and the needs of others in a primitive exchange. For Neumann the emergence of the conscious ego occurs at a transitional "Stage" he calls the "collective ethic" which roughly corresponds to Kohlberg's conventional level (Stages 3 and 4). At this "Stage" there is a conscious acceptance of Law and individuals are personally responsible to the Law or customs. What concerns us here is not so

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[1] Neumann's "Stages" are not represented by him in the cognitive developmental sense, i.e., as hierarchical, following an invariant sequence, irreversible etc., but are more descriptive and anthropological; hence the quotation marks.

much Neumann's description of the stages, which lack the precision of Kohlberg's, as his explanation of the dynamics at work which effect the transition from a primitive to collective morality. As individuals face the expectations which society has of them, in other words, as they begin to assimilate conventional mores, they find that they must conform to a set of rule expectations e.g., what "nice girls" and "good boys," "good students," "good Americans" etc., do. Since these role expectations never embrace all the conflicting impulses and emotions they want to follow, these must somehow be "cubby-holed." Intellectually, as Kohlberg says, a Stage 3 person may reject as morally repugnant the self-serving motivations and reasons of someone at Stage 2 and even provide convincing reasons for doing so. This does not change the fact that the person at Stage 3 <u>also</u> experiences similar impulses to be self-serving (as do persons at all the higher stages). The difference is that the Stage 2 person uncritically <u>owns</u> his or her self-serving impulses and experiences no dissonance while persons at higher stages must either deny the impulses or admit they are somehow at war with their own moral code. Those who deny their impulses employ the classical psychological defenses of suppression or repression and attempt to push their impulses partially or totally out of awareness. In effect they disown a part of themselves and this part retreats into the unconscious <u>where it continues to influence behavior</u>. Those who do not employ these defenses utilize some form of asceticism or training to control their impulses. Psychologically they are healthier because they do not suppress but own that part of themselves which they nevertheless

view as unacceptable, unsocial or potentially evil. The price they pay is conscious suffering over the perceived discrepancy between how they want to be and how they ought to be.

Neumann is at pains to point out that, despite the price, this step in the evolution of moral consciousness is a necessary one for the human race as a whole; for without it the differentiation of the ego from the unconscious would be incomplete. But for individuals, especially those who totally repress their primitive impulses, the price is high indeed. Huge amounts of psychic energy are diverted from life tasks to sustain the effort at repression with a consequent numbing and deadening of the self. Even more important however, are the twofold dangers either that, too long repressed, these forces will overtop the psychic defenses set against them and eventuate in destructive behavior or the mechanism of projection will come into play and others will be accused and punished (scapegoated) for the self's own banned impulses. War, violence, suicide, alcoholism, bias and discrimination are all outcomes, the price of which society is less and less able to afford to pay. In fact, Neumann contends, our recent experiences of war, violence and racial suppression make it imperative that a new level of moral consciousness emerge, if the human race is to survive. This he calls the "new ethic."

Neumann's new ethic resembles Kohlberg's principled morality in that both presume a perspective "outside" society, both are concerned with the establishment of a just society and both appeal to principle as the force that sanctions law and morality. Moreover,

they both believe that a moral person may and, in some instances, must violate the accepted moral code in the name of something higher.

They differ as to what that "something higher" is. For Kohlberg it is justice; for Neumann it is psychic wholeness. Perhaps even more importantly they differ in regard to the dynamic which facilitates the emergence of the "higher morality." I have already mentioned that Kohlberg believes that the critical dynamic is continuing role-taking opportunities and especially exposure to differing moral philosophies at college age which broaden one's role taking perspective. Other important factors mentioned by him are sustained responsibility in a decision-making role as an adult and involvement in real-life moral crises which defy solution at a conventional level.

For Neumann the moral goal is psychic wholeness and the critical dynamic by which this is achieved is by confronting one's potential for evil. In Jungian terms this means encountering all the repressed and suppressed parts of one's personality subsumed in one's personal "shadow." I need to go back and re-encounter those parts of myself which I felt I had to disown in order to be considered "good" in a conventional sense by others and myself. Even assuming that I exhibit principled moral thinking I cannot exempt myself from the task of confronting the shadow in myself. According to a principled morality with which I intellectually agree I <u>ought</u> to treat everyone with an equity based on the equal value of persons. At the same time I need to admit that within myself there is a "character" who in a sense, is set over against my ego and who would exhibit blatant favoritism to those who gratify me, destroy those who oppose me and

manipulate everyone to serve me. More frighteningly this character demands a hearing and will not tolerate simply being pushed out of the way. A trickster, he will subvert my noblest aspirations and all the while point the finger of blame at those around me. The shadow is a part of me and by a queer paradox, an internal justice demands that he get an equal hearing.

I do not intend to go into the complexities of Jungian theory regarding the shadow, for example, his conception of it as both personal and archetypal, however, a distinctive difference between Jung's and Kohlberg's thought is apparent: Kohlberg is striving for a unified theory of moral development organized around the central concept of justice. Neumann and Jung construct their theory of morality around paradox. They assert that there are intellectually irreconcilable dichotomies in the human personality and consequently in morality too. No matter how elegant and satisfying to the mind a unified theory is it runs the danger of leaving out crucial, albeit messy, elements of human experience. This experience is not unique to psychology. As Jung himself says "By way of comparison, we might mention the equally paradoxical corpuscular theory and wave theory of light, although these do at least hold out the possibility of a mathematical synthesis, which the psychological idea naturally lacks" (Jung, 1969, p. 532).

The paradox which the "new ethic" seeks to embrace is between the principle of justice and fairness toward all, reasonable, worked out and implemented and the antinomian tendencies of the shadow, willful, arbitrary, selfish and destructive. To allow the latter into

the light of day and to say "this is part of me, too," is frightening, but to deny its existence is even more dangerous for then self-deception, denial, projection and scapegoating run wild.

How each person reconciles the duality within remains for each to decide. A genuinely autonomous morality means accepting the responsibility for making one's decisions and even accepting the possibility of doing evil according to one's best light. This most emphatically does not mean surrendering to destructive impulses. It does mean admitting their existence within me and likewise admitting that my most "moral" actions are tainted with an ambiguity which makes it impossible to call them simply just. The danger of a Stage 6 morality in practice if not in theory, is that those who have attained that rarefied level of thinking will mistakenly believe that they have transcended the human condition and its complex, often contradictory emotions and desires.

To extend the paradox a bit further, it would appear that despite what I have said thus far about the apparent irreconcilability of the Jungian and Kohlbergian approaches to morality, they both do orient toward justice. Kohlberg of course, does so explicitly. Jung and Neumann do so through their concept of duty. Jung says: "The ethical problems that cannot be solved in the light of collective morality or the "old ethic" are <u>conflicts of duty</u>, otherwise they would not be ethical" (in Neumann, 1969, p. 14, emphasis his). The duty or obligation by which I am bound refers to the mediating of competing claims <u>within</u> myself especially the claims of my ego over against my unconscious and its contents as well as the claims of other

persons. This concern for an "internal justice" is not unique to Jungian psychology. While Jung speaks of complexes and archetypes, Gestalt Therapy speaks of polarities such as "top dog" and "underdog", and transactional analysis of "ego states". While differing as to theory all assert that each element of the personality should receive its proper due in relation to the others in a system analagous to a parliamentary democracy.

The Jungian concern for justice extends further, however. A person owes his or her own integration to self and to others in justice, for the fate of society in fact depends on how well its members relate to each other free of projection and biases, which makes possible the social role taking so prized by Kohlberg. Psychic wholeness contributes to a just community. Indeed the just community will not come into being without at least some of its members taking the risk of looking at their own potential for both good and evil. Conversely psychic wholeness cannot exist unless the individual is willing to subject his or her life to rigorous moral scrutiny.

The implications of this approach for moral education are immense. As I will consider in chapters four and five, it will not be sufficient merely to teach people how to solve complicated moral dilemmas like "brain teasers". Moral education must challenge individuals to look into themselves and confront the light and the dark they find there. It will have to teach them how to deal with the forces, fears and fantasies that will inevitably arise. It may involve a long-term commitment, analagous to a spiritual formation or internship. It will not be for the faint of heart. Techniques such as guided

fantasies, role playing, dream analysis, and relaxation and meditation techniques may be interspersed with more cognitive considerations of moral psychological and social theory. All of which will have the purpose of integrating the thoughts, feelings and actions of persons into an integrated whole.

CHAPTER III

MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND SPIRITUALITY

Introduction. In Chapter two, I outlined Kohlberg's theory of moral development, reviewed some reactions to it, and offered a critical evaluation. In the present chapter, I will use Kohlberg's research into moral development as a jumping-off point to investigate a related area which, if anything, is even murkier than morality, that of spirituality.

There is a theoretical and a practical reason for doing so. Theoretically, Kohlberg's research has led him to ask questions about the moral enterprise that are more philosophical than psychological. Convinced that morality of some sort is a universal human phenomenon, he asks, is there any compelling reason why we should be moral? What sense does committing oneself to the principle of justice make when the world, both natural and human, is manifestly unjust? Empirical research into the forms of morality which in fact exist does not supply an answer to the question of the motivating force behind morality. According to Kohlberg, an answer can be found only by shifting to a different level of discourse namely by addressing oneself to the religious question (Kohlberg, 1973).

The practical reason for considering spirituality in this context is that spirituality is a vital concern for millions of

people, yet there exist few but the most subjective criteria to guide anyone interested in exploring this realm and in evaluating the many competing claims. There is a profusion of religious or quasi religious movements in the United States ranging from the conservative evangelicals, charismatics and faith healers among the Christian churches to devotees to Buddhism, Sufism, Hinduism, and other established religions from the East. In addition, there are those unique hybrids which seem to grow so well in American soil such as, EST, Arica, TM, Mind Control, Scientology, among legions of others, many claiming to have a scientific basis but all, despite occasional disclaimers, assuming religious or spiritual overtones.

The somewhat weedy richness and more than occasional bizarreness of American spirituality can cause considerable confusion in the mind of the onlooker. The carnival atmosphere which frequently surrounds some of the religious personality cults can easily distract the serious student from the importance of the religious question itself inclining one to dismiss the whole affair as hokum. That would be a mistake. As I hope to illustrate in this chapter, whether asked by a Harvard professor like Kohlberg or by a potential teenage convert to Rev. Moon, the religious question continues to be one of the most important concerns of humankind.

In this chapter I propose to explore the religious or spiritual question as it is posed by the individual. Basically, I see this as a question as a search for ultimate meaning and value in life. Next, I will briefly treat a subjective "response" to the question to which many people appeal, namely the mystical, or more broadly, the

peak experience. Finally, I will propose a schema borrowed from developmental psychology which will, I hope, (a) provide the means to fit the so-called mystical experience into the broader category of spirituality, and (b) fit spirituality itself into the still broader category of personal development.

A Descriptive Definition of Spirituality. Before proceeding to the substance of the chapter, a descriptive definition of spirituality seems in order to avoid at least some of the confusion which inevitably arises around the subject. I have preferred the word "spirituality" to "religion" because the latter rather strongly suggests an organized social body with its own set of beliefs, rules, and practices. What I am more concerned with here is the individual's personal experience and response to that experience. I am quite conscious, however, that these occur in a social context and that both experience and the response to and interpretation of that experience will be greatly influenced by social religious factors. I am also aware that "spirituality" strongly implies concern with a non-material reality or realm of Spirit or spirits. My concern in this chapter, however, is not with the existence or non-existence of such a realm. In the present context spirituality means, pertaining to the highest realm of human experience, understanding, and endeavor, that which is most human. In light of this, I offer the following definition of spirituality as: The domain of ultimate meaning and value which individuals experience and/or define for themselves and around which they orient or attempt to orient their lives.

Three important elements in the definition are meaning, value and commitment. It is my contention, borrowing from Frankl, (1963,

1967), that meaning is crucial to psychological health. I suggest that spirituality is precisely the realm of ultimate or superordinate meaning. The spiritual question is, what does my life signify? What gives it its overall organization and purpose? The answers are as various as the persons asking the questions--the miser might derive meaning and purpose from the pursuit of money, the monk, of enlightenment, but consciously or not both are organizing their lives around a central meaning or purpose, that is, creating a spirituality (I leave until later in the chapter a consideration of the relative value of each).

Value is employed in the definition to indicate that the ultimate meaning referred to is not meaning in an abstract sense but involves some form of personal affirmation and involvement because of its perceived worth. Meaning and valuing lead to commitment, an attempt to live out meaning in action, not in a haphazard fashion but as the pole-star which guides one's life. It might better be described as a magnetic field that influences and orients everything within its boundaries.

The resemblances between this definition of spirituality and morality--say Kohlberg's concept of justice--are apparent. Justice might appear to lend meaning and orientation to one's moral actions at least. However, justice must ultimately appeal to something else for its validity as a goal in life and hence is not in the realm of ultimate meaning and value. Let us return for a moment to Kohlberg to perceive this more clearly.

Posing the Religious Question. Kohlberg claims that a stage six understanding of and commitment to justice marks the acme of moral

development. More recently, however, in a more philosophic bent, he has suggested (Kohlberg, 1973) that, in one sense, the achievement of stage six creates more problems than it solves. The ideal of justice remains just that, an ideal. The philosopher, however, who descends from the ivory tower and attends to the world, perceives something very different; neither humankind nor nature seem overly concerned with being just. No system of merit or virtue can account for the way nature dispenses its rewards and punishments. Some are born bright, others imbeciles, some to good health, others to disease and an early death, some to wealth, others to grinding poverty, some are wiped out in earthquake, flood, or fire, others live out their days in tranquility. Nor has humankind seemed overly committed to righting natural inequities. Rather, it has permitted and encouraged the grossest social injustices to burden even further those already deprived by nature.

Our philosopher may perhaps be unmoved even by these facts, but when his or her own flesh is touched for example, by enduring injustice, failure, illness, or the death of a loved one, then the cry against injustice rises from the heart. Kohlberg contends that perhaps the greatest cry is wrung from us when we perceive the inevitability of our own death. Why be moral when we and all our endeavors end up in exactly the same place as the person who cares not a whit about morality? Is not striving for justice merely one more form of self-deception, the acting out of an illusion that what we do in a meaningless universe really matters? There is, Kohlberg asserts, no level of moral reasoning, which can provide an answer to these kinds of questions. A commitment to justice is not self-validating and one must enter a different

level of experience. Comparing his approach with Erikson's he states it this way (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 53):

> Erikson's ideal man has passed through his sixth stage of generativity and becomes an ethical man, an ideal corresponding to our Stage 6. There remains for Erikson's man a task which is partly ethical, but more basically religious (in the broadest sense of the word, "religious"), a task defining a seventh stage whose outcomes are a sense of integrity versus a sense of despair. The problem of integrity is not the problem of moral integrity, but the problem of integration, and integrity of meaning of the individual's life and its negative side, despair, hovers around the awareness of death. The problem is also psychological. The concept of the self's integrity is psychological, but the concept of the integrity of the meaning of the self's life is philosophical or religious.

As Kohlberg states the problem, it appears to be an issue that arises rarely and only among those who have attained a Stage six level of morality (less than one percent of the population). It would scarcely account for the number and variety of spiritual "trips" in this country. There are not too many people with either the leisure or the inclination to view their own death in this light. Most are too taken up with the practical concerns of living, or so it would seem. If we, therefore, believe that a spirituality generally evolves from an existential encounter with death, then we are accounting for only a small percentage of the many spiritualities existing today.

There are, however, persuasive arguments to the contrary. Ernest Becker in his Denial of Death (1975) asserts that, far from being the concern of a few philosophers and/or neurotics, "the idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing else; it is the mainspring of human activity--actively designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny of man" (Becker, 1975, p. ix).

Becker was a cultural anthropologist but his writings span several disciplines including history, psychology, and philosophy. In The Denial of Death, first published in 1973, be reinterpreted the psychoanalytic concept of psychosexual development in a broader, more existential manner as stages in the universal, human attempt to find meaning and value in the fact of death. Against the argument that few people, much less children, are consciously preoccupied with death he responds (Becker, 1975, p. 13):

> If the child has no knowledge of an abstract idea like absolute negation, he does have his own anxieties. He is absolutely dependent on the mother, experiences loneliness when she is absent, frustration when he is deprived of gratification, irritation at hunger and discomfort, and so on. If he were abandoned to himself, his world would drop away, and his organism must sense this at some level; we call this the anxiety of object loss. Isn't this anxiety, then, a natural, organismic fear of annihilation?

It is Becker's contention, then, that this fear of annihilation, this basic experience of creaturely dependence and insecurity, is with us all the time albeit at an unconscious level even in our earliest years and is merely the psychological recognition of the ontological truth: we are in fact creatures whose existence is precarious and limited. This reality is too stark for any of us to keep before us for very long. It is too painful to bear and it would likely paralyze us if we thought about it much. Hence, to some extent, our attempts to repress that dawning knowledge is a healthy step. According to Becker, then, what the Freudians called "anality" is in fact a crisis in meaning. We, who desire to occupy center stage in a world of human meaning and purpose are forced to confront the fact that we occupy but a tiny corner of a universe vaster than any attempt to imagine it.

It is a universe which, if not random, eludes by far, our attempts to determine its unifying meaning. This split between what we can grasp and what we aspire to is symbolized by our bodies. We have heads that look up to the heavens and anuses that tie us to the earth. We are gods, but gods-who-shit, desiring immortality but subject to transient, biological processes, decay and death. The so-called "anal" response is an attempt to control our fate by an excessive concern for order, structure, and cleanliness. If things get out of order, if we lose control, then we risk being submerged in random disorder and death.

Similarly the "oedipal project" has much more than sexual overtones. We desire to be our own fathers, "causae suorum", self caused and therefore, immortal. We embark on life-long projects, raising families, establishing businesses, and involving ourselves in causes, all of which create in us a sense of meaning, purpose, and worth in the face of death.

Transference too is reinterpreted by Becker as an unconscious attempt to find meaning outside ourselves by identifying with someone or a cause greater than ourselves. He sees this as a universal phenomenon not limited to the transaction between therapist and patient. Certain people whom we encounter seem to possess a special <u>mana</u> or charisma which captures us. Similar to the phenomenon of falling in love, transference inspires us to a level of devotion and service that is puzzling to observers. Becker interprets this as an inevitable and basically healthy projection in order to find meaning and value in our lives. The suppressed fear of death, however, gives to the devotee the sense that everything is at stake in the relationship. To lose

the other person, to become disillusioned with the cause, to see the project or business fail, brings the person, at least momentarily, up against the repressed reality that "all this will pass", that nothing and no one endures. As Kohlberg's Stage 6 hero wonders about the worth of the moral project, so Becker's existential seeker wonders about the worth of any project in the face of death.

Becker, then adds some breadth to Kohlberg's tentative ventures into the relationship between morality and spirituality. Although some may balk at his reliance on such concepts as anality, oedipal stage, and transference weighted as they are with Freudian connotations, he convincingly develops his central thesis that one of the unifying concepts behind human activity is to experience and express meaning and value in an existence circumscribed by space and time. He lends credence, therefore, to our contention that spirituality--understood according to the definition offered above as the domain of meaning and value around which people orient their lives--is a central human concern deserving of further systematic inquiry.

If the spiritual <u>question</u> appears to be a legitimate one let us now spend a few moments investigating, in the limited space available in this chapter, the <u>answers</u> traditionally offered to the question. There are, of course, almost as many answers as there are people and a comprehensive review of them would involve a survey of all philosophic and religious thought. I will limit myself here to describing the outlines of that phenomenon commonly called the "religious" or "mystic" experience found in virtually all religions.

Traditionally the answer to the problem of meaning in the face

of evil and death has been some sort of transcendent experience giving rise to the conviction that, despite suffering and death, everything will be all right. This type of experience has been given many names, a conversion experience, a mystical trance, enlightenment, satori and more recently, with Maslow, a peak experience. Insofar as these experiences speak to the problem outlined thusfar, they convey a fundamental, intuitive sense that everything ultimately cooperates for the good. This usually happens as the result of experiencing some form of "cosmic consciousness" during which the person feels a sense of oneness with and participation in the universe. For Kohlberg its essential "is the sense of being a part of the whole of life and the adaption of a cosmic, as opposed to a universal humanistic (Stage 6) perspective" (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 55). This experience may or may not include a belief in God (Ibid., p. 56):

> Even most persons who are not "religious" temporarily achieve this state of mind when on the mountain top or before the ocean. At such a time, what is ordinarily background becomes foreground, and the self is no longer figure to the ground. We sense the unity of the whole and ourselves as part of that unity. This experience of unity, often treated as a mere rush of mystic feeling, is also associated with the structure of conviction.

William James in his The Varieties of Religious Experiences (1902), still a standard text for students of religious phenomena, cites many examples of experiences of this nature. One such example concerns Richard Bucke, himself the author of a book on "cosmic consciousness" at the turn of the century. He describes his own experience while riding home in a hansom from a pleasant evening with friends (James, 1902, pp. 380-381):

> My mind, deeply under the influence of the ideas, images, and emotions, called up by the reading and talk, was calm and peaceful. I was in a state of quiet, almost passive enjoyment, not actually thinking, but letting ideas, images, and emotions flow of themselves, as it were, through my mind. All at once, without warning of any kind, I found myself wrapped in a flame colored cloud. For an instant, I thought of fire, an immense conflagration somewhere close by in that great city; the next, I knew that the fire was within myself. Directly afterward there came upon me a sense of exultation of immense joyousness accompanied or immediately followed by an intellectual illumination impossible to describe. Among other things, I did not merely come to believe, but I saw that the universe is not composed of dead matter, but is on the contrary, a living Presence; I became conscious in myself of eternal life....I saw that all men are immortal; that the cosmic order is such that without any peradventure all things work together for the good of each and all; that the foundation principle of the world, of all worlds is what we call love, and that the happiness of each and all is in the long run absolutely certain. The vision lasted a few seconds and was gone but the memory of it and the sense of the reality of what it taught has remained during the quarter of a century which has since elapsed. I knew that what the vision showed was true. That view, that conviction, I may say that consciousness, has never, even during periods of the deepest depression, been lost.

Not all mystical experiences are as powerful as this one but from such experiences as these James deduced four common characteristics (Ibid., p. 380-381):

1. Ineffability. It is an experience that is fundamentally incommunicable to others. In this regard it is more like a feeling than an intellectual state.
2. Noetic quality. The experience does, however, include an "understanding", but it is an understanding which is intuitive rather than discursive. In the experience itself, the meaning of life, suffering and death appears clear. The experience contains or perhaps more accurately is the "answer" to the absence of meaning. However, it seems impossible to communi-

cate this answer to others. James notes that because of their incommunicable nature these experiences have no authority to compel others outside the experience to accept the "truth" contained within. The experiences do, however, "break down the authority of the non-mystical or rational consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith" (James, 1902, p. 332).

3. Transiency. Mystical experiences seldom last more than a half hour. However, from such experiences an underlying development can take place based, as it were, on the insights gained from these transient events.

4. Passivity. The experience seems to happen to people rather than being initiated or generated by them. Certain voluntary preparatory events such as prayer, meditation etc., may or may not precede it but the event itself appears to be of a wholly different order. As James describes it, "the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power" (Ibid., p. 381).

The outcome of the mystical experience is a feeling of assurance, a state of virtually unshakeable certitude, that even in the face of death, life has meaning because the mystic has experienced that meaning in an almost sensuous way. The experience described,

then, is not a natural outgrowth and reorganization of a lower cognitive or moral stage, a higher level of abstraction or of justice; rather it appears to be radically discontinuous with what precedes it. It pertains to a different way of knowing too little understood in the western intellectual tradition. In a unique way, it appears to unite the concrete and specific with the abstract and universal, intellect and will with emotions and sensations to create an experience of wholeness and oneness with Being.

More recently Maslow (1970) has ascribed similar attributes to what he calls "peak experiences" which he believes to be natural expressions of human nature. In these experiences "the universe is perceived as an integrated and unified whole..." a perception so profound that "it can change the person's character and his Weltanschauung for ever after" (Ibid., p. 59). The cognition of being (B-cognition) is more detached from human concerns and instrumentalities so that the world is perceived as it is in itself (what Kohlberg calls a "decentering of the ego"), rather than how it may be used. The experience is self-validating, that is it needs to appeal to nothing else to justify it and life itself. "Peak experiences can make life worthwhile by their occasional occurance. They give meaning to life itself" (Ibid., p. 62). The world is seen as good, beautiful, worthwhile, etc. In the process evil is accepted and integrated into the whole as are other dichotomies and polarities. Like James, Maslow sees the peak experiences as passive, that is as happening to the person and rendering him or her more humble and ready to listen. They can even parallel the experience of dying the

"good death", that is they include an element of reconciliation and acceptance of death. People simultaneously feel more like themselves, active, capable, and responsible and more able to transcend themselves to become, at least relatively, selfless and egoless.

From the description it would appear that mystical or peak experiences would be extremely rare occurances. Maslow, at one time divided his subjects into "peakers" and "non peakers"--those who had and did not have peak experiences. Gradually, however, he became convinced that some sort of peak experiences were available to virtually everyone and that those who did not report them were afraid of them, suppressed them, and managed to "forget" them. He suggested that for those with mechanistic or materialistic world views, peak experiences had no place and were interpreted, when they did occur, as threats to their sanity. His opinion, to my knowledge, was more impressionistic than backed up by hard data.

More recently, Greely (1974) has attempted to determine how frequently mystical or peak experiences do occur in the general population. He conducted a national survey composed of 1467 subjects. Among the questions he asked was: "With what frequency have you felt as though you were very close to a powerful, spiritual force that seemed to lift you out of yourself?" (Greely, 1974, p. 140). In a preliminary analysis of the data he reports that thirty-five percent of his subjects responded that this had occurred once or several times in their experience. It would seem that this type of experience then, is not at all rare. Greely, who describes himself as "a hard-nosed rational empiricist skeptic" and "one of the least mystical persons

I know" (Ibid., p. 123), speculates that perhaps 50% of the American population has some form of mystical or peak experience, some of which may not fall under the type of question framed in his questionnaire.

Although investigations like Maslow's and Greely's leave much to be desired in terms of providing us with hard data, they do suggest that there exists a wide-spread phenomenon of human experience which by its own power and illumination conveys to those who undergo it the concrete conviction and understanding that their lives have meaning in the cosmic scheme of things. Because these experiences are subjective and essentially incommunicable it would seen that, apart from describing and cataloguing them, psychology would have little to say about them. However, these experiences happen to human subjects who are subject to the same developmental schemata as everyone else. Mystics invariably interpret their experiences both to themselves and other people. The quality of these interpretations depends on the individuals cultural background, world-view, and level of development. Moreover, it has happened more than once in human history that mystics have spearheaded social revolution, frequently with disastrous consequences. To note just one negative instance, Cohn (1970) describes the depradations of one John Bockelson, known as John of Leyden, a sixteenth century anabaptist and apparently a genuine, though unbalanced, mystic (Cohn cited in Greely, 1974, pp. 103-106).

> The Anabaptist boasted of their innocence of book-learning and declared that it was the unlearned who had been chosen by God to redeem the world. When they sacked the cathedral they took particular delight in defiling, tearing up, and burning the books and manuscripts of its old library....

> Bockelson's first important act (as the new ruler of the city of Munster) was--characteristically--at once a religious and a political one. Early in May he ran naked through the town in a frenzy and then fell into a silent ecstasy which lasted three days. When speech returned to him, he called the population together and announced that God had revealed to him that the constitution of the town, being the work of men, must be replaced by a new one which would be the work of God....

What followed was a new legal code encompassing a strange combination of puritanical morality, socialism, and sexual license (for men only) cruelly enforced.

> Terror...was intensified during Bockelson's reign. Within a few days of his proclamation of the monarchy Dusentschur (a Bockelson sympathizer) proclaimed that it had been revealed to him that in the future all who persisted in sinning against the recognized truth must be brought before the king and sentenced to death....Within a couple of days, executions began. The first victims were women; one was beheaded for denying her husband his marital rights, another for bigamy--for the practice was of course entirely a male prerogative--a third for insulting a preacher and mocking his doctrine.

Instances to the contrary, of course, can be cited of other mystics who made monumental contributions to society as well. I note this one example, in fact, representative of hundreds of others, to emphasize that while mysticism is frequently a very private and subjective experience, it can and sometimes does have potent social consequences. It behooves us, therefore, not only to respect the uniqueness of the mystical experience, but also to be concerned with the overall intellectual, moral, and emotional development of those who have them. For it is on this development that will depend how mystics make sense of their experience and relate it to their everyday experience and life.

The fact that many spiritual movements with mystic overtones in the United States today seem to want to remove themselves as far as

possible from social involvement, does not guarantee that this will always be so. In fact, some, such as the Arica training, exist for the express purpose of effecting a social change of consciousness. However laudable the goal, mystical awareness is often combined with social naivete and sometimes something worse. A friend of mine recounts how during his advanced training as an Arican, many of his co-trainees, (who would soon be training others), regularly stole money and valuables from each other. Evidently, their level of social consciousness had not yet matched the heights of their mystical aspirations.

It seems therefore, that mysticism or, in secular terms, peak experiences, do play an important role in assisting some people to come to terms with the meaning of their lives. It is then an important, and perhaps a necessary ingredient for those who seek a meaning and value which reason alone cannot provide them with. However, as must also be becoming apparent, mystical or peak experiences need to be integrated into one's overall psychological and social make-up for a genuine spirituality to come into being.

I will now, therefore, propose some tentative criteria which should enable the investigator to determine how effectively a given form of spirituality (with mystical overtones or not) contributes to human development overall.

Developmental Criteria. As long as a mystical experience remains personal and uncommunicated, and as long as it has no influence on how one orients and directs one's life, it does not figure as a part of a person's spirituality as I defined it earlier. Once,

however, it is recognized as a basis for meaning and purpose in life and one begins to act in light of the significance and direction provided by it, then a social dimension begins to manifest itself. A private, subjective phenomenon, as it were, goes public. It is at this level that it is capable of being studied and evaluated according to developmental criteria. The experience itself may be ineffable and essentially incommunicable, but this does not discourage people from attempting to understand their experience, to fit it into schemata derived from their everyday experience, and to communicate what happened to others. This they can only do according to the level of personal and social adjustment they have attained. Thus a John of Leyden, a Francis of Assisi, a Don Juan Mateus, a Baba Ram Das, have all probably had ineffable mystical experiences but each has received it within the context of a unique personal and cultural history which can be observed and to some extent, evaluated. It is at this level that I believe some of the developmental insights of Piaget, Kohlberg and Loevinger can be employed fruitfully. What I offer below is a theoretical schema, based on no data, which attempts to adapt developmental theory to types of spirituality. In this schema, I will attempt to describe how individuals view the ultimate source of meaning in their lives and how they relate to that meaning. In addition, I will suggest what might be typical feeling responses at each stage. Finally, I will attempt to express what kind of social relationships might derive from a given attitude. I do not offer these descriptions as stages in the strict cognitive developmental sense outlined in Chapter two, that is an invariant and successively more adequate and

comprehensive reorganizations of lower stages. I do envision them, however, as descriptive of a general developmental trend leading toward greater overall maturity. I assume that, were someone to attempt to test out this hypothetical construct through some form of data gathering, it would undergo considerable, possibly even drastic revision. This schema is offered merely as a starting point.

Hypothetical Stages of Spiritual Development

Stage 1 - Source of Meaning at Stage 1 is an equivocal term since meaning here tends to be identified with an extrinsic and arbitrary power or exercise of power. The universe is conceived of as operating by force or sometimes conflicting forces of either a personal or impersonal nature outside the individual. The force on forces supply our basic physical needs (sometimes) in an arbitrary way. As a result, life is a hazardous enterprise and an important ingredient for survival is unquestioning subordination to the powers that be. Part of this subordination involves the observance of taboos about certain places, objects, and things. Violation of the taboos carries with it an automatic reprisal and a cutting off from the power source. This can only be undone by some form of propitiation which has the effect of re-establishing contact with the source.

Feeling Response is a feeling of fear and awe in the sense described by Otto (1958) that is not simply fear

of someone stronger but fear of something uncanny and basically unfathomable.

Social Relationship. This deference to a superior spiritual power carries over into other relationships--especially those involving a spiritual fraternity or association. Authority is exercised and deferred to absolutely.

Stage 2 - Source of Meaning resides partly outside the individual and partly within. In both cases, it remains somewhat arbitrary and fragmented depending as it does on the fulfillment of various needs as they arise; one cannot always know from moment to moment what needs will be foreground. The extrinsic source can be a supernatural power or the demands of society (conceived concretely at this stage as this or that person "in power" or simply another person. The individual relates to any of these three as having sets of needs similar to one's own and is willing to "trade off" to fulfill each other's needs conjointly (Kohlberg's "you scratch my back; I'll scratch yours"). In a formally religious context this involves the invocation of magic to give the "powers that be" what they need while simultaneously compelling them to accede to the individual's needs. Some forms of "chain-prayers", novenas, and even certain aspects of sacramental prayers reflect this attitude of compelling compliance.

Feeling Response is of self assertion and derives from increased awareness and acknowledgement of one's own needs as having a certain validity over against the extrinsic demands of others. What is still lacking, however, is sufficient ego strength to pull together various competing needs within oneself to organize and direct them towards self-chosen goals. Fulfillment of the needs are the goals and the highest meaning at this stage. Social Relations exist only to facilitate the gratification of individual needs. Relationships are basically opportunistic and manipulative and may involve a trading in spiritual goals. For example, one may desire a spiritual "high" (a kind of spiritual hedonism) because the "high" makes one feel good and affiliate with an organization (usually at some cost) to obtain it. There is no common goal or commitment involved; only individuals seeking to gratify their own needs (Something like this may have been in effect among the Aricans who saw no conflict in their spiritual quest and stealing from each other).

Stage 3 - Source of Meaning derives from introjected values of one's family, and immediate social and religious milieux. At this stage, one is concerned for the first time with a sense of self-worth which, at this

point, comes from the approval of others. The tension between self and other is adjusted to by internalizing the demands of others in the form of a "conscience" (the Freudian Superego, the T. A. Parent, the Gestalt "Top dog") while preserving one's own resistance (the Id, or Child, or "Underdog"). The former, however, tends to predominate, if socialization proceeds apace, because self-worth is more or less confused with survival. If one is not approved of, one will be excluded from the family or group making survival impossible (not always a mere fantasy!). Therefore, individuals derive the greatest meaning they are capable of at this stage from the family, social, or religious symbols of their immediate environment.

Feeling Response is a need for approval and a desire to please. This is combined with an increased ability to appreciate the feeling states of others (empathy). There is also a tendency to disown socially unacceptable feelings and either to repress and/or to project them onto others.

Social Relationships. Belonging to likeminded groups becomes important here. In a religious context, the small religious group or church predominates. "Fellowship" is emphasized but is sometimes in stark contrast to the reaction toward outsiders or non-

believers which is often intolerant and hostile. A slightly less hostile response is the fervid "evangelization" of non-believers to rescue them from their own ignorance and, incidentally, to reassure the believers that their own way is the truth.

Stage 4 - Source of Meaning. Systematized creeds, normative writings, and traditions derived from one's cultural milieu became paramount definers of meaning for the individual. One's sense of identity and self-worth shifts from parental approval to a sense of belonging to a larger social body. Personal meaning is mediated through society, religious, and/or secular. Institutions take on a hallowed quality and are seen as sources of absolute value e.g., the Constitution, the Apostles' Creed, the Papacy etc. Society, its institutions and traditions, is seen as a bulwark against social chaos and personal loss of identity. From one's perspective within a given social meaning system other systems are acknowledged but only as inferior approximations or opponents of one's own. The world is divided between Capitalism and Communism, the true believer and the infidel. The individual emphasizes and tends to identify with the observance of forms, roles and conventions.

Feeling Response is a strong sense of loyalty to Church, Country, Party, combined with intolerance of the opposition. Unacceptable feelings and impulses are projected onto other groups. Social Relationships include reverence toward superiors (what the Romans called the social virtue of "pietas"), and a strict adherence to and administration of socially defined responsibilities. One tends to relate to roles, not people. The value of the person increases or decreases according to the position occupied by him or her in the social structure. "Heretics" or "Communists" are outside the pale and therefore, not entitled to the same respect as those within.

Stage 5 - Source of Meaning. At this stage a crisis of meaning develops as individuals encounter meaning systems which possess a validity apparently equal to their own. They become aware, because of an increased time perspective and sense of history, of the cultural conditioning and somewhat adventitious nature of their own construction of meaning. As in the moral realm, this sometimes leads to a period of anomie so in the spiritual realm it can result in a kind of existential despair. All meaning and purpose is called into question. One is freed from one's social role and institutional

"faith" only to lose one's sense of direction altogether. For others, perhaps more optimistic, the search begins for a unifying principle or principles within oneself and among the multiplicity of creeds and dogmas, for both a cognitive and an existential-experiential ground of meaning. These people tend to seek a more personal and immediate means of relating to this ground of meaning rather than being content, as were those at Stage 4, to have that meaning mediated to them through institutions and social structures. Historically, in the West, Martin Luther embodied this attempt. Institutionally, however, his attempt failed for the most part, because his followers, probably not at his level of development, merely substituted one institution, the bible as interpreted by the various Protestant "divines" for another, Roman Catholic tradition as interpreted by the pope. Today similar incidents occur as many young people reject traditional western meaning systems, both secular and religious in favor of eastern models. The context of belief changes but in many instances the transition is merely from reliance on a western tradition as interpreted by one's local pastor to reliance on an eastern tradition as interpreted by a guru. Meaning and value

remain extrinsic to their own experience.

Feeling Response. Characteristic of this stage is a growing sense of identity as a person distinct from one's role within society. This seems to be a uniquely western phenomenon. While reorganizing and actively encouraging and reforming human institutions, people at this stage predicate the value of institutions on how well they contribute to the expansion and growth of persons rather than predicating the value of persons on how much they contribute to the institution or the collective. Social Relationships tend to be ecumenical and inclusive rather than sectarian and exclusive. The principle of tolerance is willingly affirmed.

Stage 6 - Source of Meaning subjectively depends on the individuals own experience and understanding of his or her self. Included in this is (a) a level of self-knowledge that includes an awareness and assessment of one's defenses and projections; (b) being in touch with that larger and more comprehensive self that underlies but embraces our social selves (Jung's persona) and our ego personalities. Various systems give this larger whole different names. Jung calls it the self, Assagioli the superconscious etc. Essentially one perceives that one's own being is or can be a self-validating source of meaning and

value. Concomitantly one perceives the underlying unity joining self and the world. The duality of self and other, self and the world is overcome so that meaning is not an arbitrary self-ish choice but understood to be synchronous with the objective order of things. This appears to be one of the more important insights intuitively grasped in mystical or peak experiences. The experiences, however, are not always integrated well enough to be expressed cognitively or socially perhaps because the individual has not developed far enough.

Feeling Response. One's sense of identity comprehends the whole self rather than the ego and concomitantly one experiences a sense of oneness with the cosmos sometimes described as "oceanic feelings". This may be combined with the resolution to dedicate oneself to the goals toward which everything is moving.

Social Relationship. One recognizes the essential oneness of all creation and relates to all people as brothers and sister. This carries over to one's relationship with other life-forms and even inanimate matter. Examples of this may be found in the writings of Francis of Assisi--see his Canticle to the Sun--and Teilhard de Chardin.

This sixth stage, is of course, the most

hypothetical of all and well beyond my own experience. Hence, I can only describe it "from below" as I imagine it might be.

Mysticism and Development

With the exception of the sixth stage, none of the stages described above assumes the necessity of mystical experiences. It seems quite possible that one could develop a spirituality, that is a meaning system around which one would attempt to organize one's life, without a mystical transport. As mentioned previously, the miser has organized such a meaning system around money, no matter how impoverished that system might be. (At best, such a person would probably be at Stage 2). On the other hand, neither should we exclude mystical experiences from the lower stages as Kohlberg by implication appears to do. But according to the venerable saying of the Medieval schoolmen "Quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur", which in modern paraphrase may be translated: "Who you are will determine how you process what you take in." The signal being sent may be stereophonic but a crystal set will reduce it to its own capacity to receive. Thus a John of Leyden translated his "vision" into a reign of terror, probably because of a Stage 1 orientation. A pentecostal fundamentalist may translate a similar experience into a Stage 3 relationship with a very personal Saviour with strong, emotional overtones and found a community of the "saved" who are very loving toward each other, but exclude those who have not yet "seen the light" etc. It is only to achieve a Stage 6 orientation that I would posit the necessity of some form of intuitive, visionary experience,

combined, of course, with the developmental maturity to assimilate and to express it creatively. As Kohlberg accurately notes, there is no rational, logical resolution of the problem of evil and death which ultimately must be integrated into a comprehensive meaning system. Voltaire long ago skewered with his mordant wit those who made fatuous attempts to argue from reason that this was the best of all possible worlds. The oneness, meaningfulness, and ultimate goodness of all that is must be <u>experienced</u> not argued. And to do so, discursive reason must, temporarily at least, step aside. Thus eastern systems such as zen literally dumbfound the mind with insoluble koans to distract it, thereby allowing for the breakthrough of a deeper, intuitive reality and western systems speak of the "via negativa" and the "dark night of the soul" in which reason shuts down before a reality which it can only apprehend as darkness. At our present level of understanding, however, psychological and/or spiritual techniques can only prepare the way for that most mysterious of all human phenomena.

Whoever, therefore, are concerned with orienting their lives around a central meaning and value system would do well in their education to pay attention to their overall personal and moral development. In addition, in their investigation of various psychological or religious systems which promise enlightment, it would be important to examine with a critical eye how well each system contributes to the increased integration and development of the individual both personally and socially. If one's viewpoint is holistic, then one's spirituality, too, will contribute to the overall growth of the individual and humankind.

CHAPTER IV

MORAL EDUCATION

Having examined some of the theoretical implications of both moral and spiritual development, let us now examine some attempts to apply developmental insights to education. In the present chapter I will focus on a cross-section of educational approaches to moral development leaving to Chapter five a proposal for a spiritual education curriculum.

Only those educational approaches that have a developmental orientation will be considered here. These may be divided into two categories: 1) those which are a direct outgrowth of and somewhat limited to Kohlberg's cognitive developmental research and, 2) those which accept Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental orientation but have also drawn on other psychological (mainly humanistic) orientations to enrich their curricula. The former group of curriculum designers represents a somewhat "purist" approach to cognitive developmental education apparently shared by Kohlberg himself who seems uncomfortable with attempts to wed cognitive-developmental and humanistic-existential orientations in a single curriculum. His discomfort derives from a suspicion on his part that humanistic education "sometimes assumes not only that emotional aspects of education are important aspects of the educational process, but that spontaneous

emotional experience and expression are educational goods or aims in themselves" (emphasis his). He contrasts this with the cognitive developmental approach which "stresses that the cognitive reorganization of experience through successively higher levels (including emotional experience) is the basic aim of education" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 74). Other differences in approach which Kohlberg sees are an emphasis on the here and now and the uniquely individual by the humanists as opposed to the cognitive-developmentalists' concern for long term and universal progressions; the humanistic emphasis on spontaneity, creativity, openness to experience and trust, he considers just another "bag of virtues" developmentally no different than the "Boy Scout bag" of honesty, responsibility, loyalty, self-control, etc.

Kohlberg, and presumably the developers of purely cognitive developmental curricula, consider that the two approaches, if not contradictory, are at least confusing when melded into a single curriculum. In contrast, some educators, whom, for want of a better word, I will call developmental-humanistic, believe that the two approaches are, or can be, complementary. Although intrigued by Kohlberg's impressive theoretical structure, they consider the educational applications attempted by most cognitive-developmentalists to be univocal, unimaginative and, for the most part, simply dull. They persist in the belief that any number of humanistic approaches to education will not only foster the humanistic "bag of virtues" but simultaneously will foster development in the strictest sense of the word. This is an orientation that I share as will become obvious as this chapter develops.

A. Cognitive Developmental Approaches to Education

1. The Plus One Match. When Kohlberg first performed his research in moral development at the University of Chicago in the middle nineteen fifties, he gave no thought to its educational applications. Indeed, he doubted that his research could be applied directly in the classroom. However, additional experimentation by Turiel (1965) and by Blatt (Blatt, M., and Kohlberg, L., 1973) indicated that educational interventions to raise the level of moral judgment were possible. It was Blatt who tested this hypothesis in an actual classroom setting.

His first attempt was in a Jewish Sunday School near Boston with a small class of a dozen eleven and twelve year olds. He hypothesized that by encouraging group discussions of moral dilemmas drawn from the book of Genesis and of some modern dilemmas as well he could significantly raise the classes' mean moral judgment score. As teacher, he was active in the discussion himself by supporting children's arguments which seemed developmentally higher than their classmates'. In addition, when the class appeared to have reached a consensus relying on arguments from, say, Stage 3, Blatt would introduce a contradictory argument using Stage 4 reasoning. He was relying on Turiel's (1965) findings which indicated that people can understand reasoning one stage above their own level of moral thinking (hence the expression "plus one"). He hoped, by so doing, that the class would move gradually toward the acquisition of Stage 4 reasoning.

Kohlberg's moral judgment test was administered to the participants before and after the one hour twelve-week course, as well as a

year later. Blatt found that the mean increase of his class from pre-test to post-test was a statistically significant two thirds of a stage. Expressed differently, 63% of his students moved up one stage, 9% moved up half a stage, and 28% remained about the same. Comparison with three control groups (comprised of Turiel's experimental and two control groups) of similar age, socio-economic background and level of moral development showed that changes in the latter ranged from -17 to +08 (a full stage change = 100) which was not statistically significant. A one year follow-up post-test showed a slight, statistically insignificant decline among both experimental and control groups. In effect, the gains made by the Sunday School students held.

The success of this experimental teaching venture induced Blatt to test his teaching techniques on a wider scale. His next study took place in the Chicago area, in the sixth and tenth grades of two public school systems which drew on a lower middle and lower class population respectively. Blatt met with his students twice a week for 18, 45 minute periods. His teaching style was the same as in the earlier experiment; the dilemmas were new ones, of his own invention, which highlighted specific issues used in Kohlberg's scoring methods such as Law, Conscience, Property, Life, etc. Again the result was a statistically significant upward movement in moral reasoning, as measured by the Kohlberg scale, although not so dramatically as in the earlier experiment. In this case the mean score of the classes was only one third of a stage higher on the post-test and only 19% increased one full stage. Among 80% of the experimental group there was no significant change. Among those from different socio-economic

backgrounds, the sixth graders from the lower class population and the tenth graders from the lower middle class gained the most, a 45 and 52 mean point increase respectively. Blatt offers no explanation why this was so. Again the changes seemed to hold in a follow-up test done two years later. However, although the differences between experimental and control groups are still significantly different, one interesting phenomenon is that experimental group II (a group that had discussed moral dilemmas among themselves with their regular teacher present but not participating actively) had made up more than half the difference between it and experimental group I. (Blatt's guided discussion group). On the immediate post-test there was a 25 point difference between the two groups. On the two year follow-up there was only a 12 point difference. One wonders if a subsequent follow-up would show any significant difference at all between the two groups.

Of particular interest, as far as classroom technique is concerned, is Blatt's highly interventive style. Typescripts of his discussion show him taking up approximately half the air-time. In addition his comments are often quite leading. He does not merely facilitate discussion but directs it, focusing attention on what he thinks is important. Here is an example from a discussion among sixth grade lower middle class students about law (Blatt, 1973, Appendix A):

Student C:	It's--there's not a law but--
Mr. B:	What kind of law may be involved? It's not a legal law, although it may be, it doesn't have to be. What kind of law is it? What were you saying about your mother? What did she say?
Student B:	God's law.

Mr. B:	God's law. What does it say about killing?
Student B:	Thou shalt not kill.
Students B and F:	God's law is moral law.
Mr. B:	What do you mean?
Student B:	Cause this is the laws of his country and God has moral laws for everybody.
Mr. B:	Oh, so what you're saying is--did you listen to what he's saying? Would you repeat what you said? It's very important.
Student B:	God's law is for everyone and there's different laws in different countries, so God's law, his moral laws are for everyone.
Student D:	God's laws include more people than down here, yes.
Mr. B:	Now what you're saying is that God's laws are for all people regardless of where you live. And so, they're universal laws, right? They're for the whole universe is what you're saying. All right. Now you said, from the legal point of view he was right (in refusing to lend his car to get a seriously injured person to a hospital), from a moral point of view he was wrong. He had a legal right to refuse his property but no moral right to do so. Now what about Mr Jones? Was Mr. Jones justified from a legal point of view beating up the man and taking his car?

One gets the impression that Blatt knows where he is going and the students are being led there. He cuts off a student in midsentence and then focuses attention where he wants it: "--did you listen to what he's saying...? It's very important." As students grope for the distinction between legal and moral, a very important insight, Blatt takes the occasion to deliver a mini-lecture on the distinction,

introducing a new term "universal" in the process and then quickly moves on to another question without stopping to see if indeed his interpretation of what the student was saying was correct or if the students had understood what he meant by universal laws.

In effect, in the initial attempt at a more democratic procedure for teaching moral development, Blatt still betrays a rather authoritarian approach to the classroom. His opinions obviously count for more as he exercises his authority to talk about what he considers important, apparently with only a minimal regard for whether or not the majority of students are with him. It seems like the new wine of the cognitive developmental approach is still contained within the old wineskin of an authoritarian teaching style. Insofar as this was a new experiment on Blatt's part, it is certainly understandable that he had difficulty making the transition from one style to another smoothly. What is less understandable, however, is that so many cognitive-developmentalists continue to revere this teaching style as prototypically developmental.

Kohlberg, referring to a high school class participating in a psychological education project, insists that, "these kids need a course to develop the humanistic bag of virtues, to listen to people's feelings, to express feelings, to be spontaneous, like they need a hole in the head" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 76). What he apparently fails to see is that being able to listen, to understand and to empathize contribute directly to the role-taking ability which Kohlberg himself holds to be one of the central dynamics of moral development. In fairness to him he is not contending that children don't need these

"virtues" but, rather, that they already possess them. But this is a gratuitous assumption backed by no data. Children model adults. Teachers who do not listen will beget students who do not listen.

The important lesson to be learned from all this is that teachers need the skills to facilitate discussion in a non-authoritarian way. This includes not only knowing where a student may have placed on a moral maturity test but being sensitive in the here and now of a discussion to what a student is attempting to articulate to self and others out of his or her experience; it includes giving students room to arrive at their own conclusions rather than preempting that process to illustrate one's own convictions. Instruction may remain as an important ingredient of moral education, even if it is merely instruction in developmental process, but the pacing of instruction and the adapting of it according to the readiness of the student to hear remains a crucial teaching skill to which thus far I have seen the cognitive-developmentalists pay too little attention.

Finally movement toward a greater autonomy combined with increased respect for others characteristic of democratic structures and higher levels of moral maturity will not occur if teachers themselves behave autocratically in their classroom. The importance of this has not been missed by Kohlberg, who, as we will see shortly, insists on the need of a democratic structuring of both classroom and school. However, he seems uncharacteristically blind to the importance of the quality of the personal interaction between teacher and student without which any democratic structure will be subverted, qualities which he somewhat disparagingly refers to as the humanistic

bag of virtues.

2. Teacher Training. Blatt attempted to teach children. Marcia Mutterer-Mentkowski and Richard Hersh are developing curricula to teach teachers. To my knowledge their curriculum has not been tested experimentally to determine whether teachers taking their course do themselves develop. Rather the focus in their courses has been to teach developmental theory and to broaden the teacher's repertoire of skills and techniques in teaching moral development. They have developed four modules (Mentkowski and Hersh, 1975): Module I introduces the teacher to some of the Piagetian concepts underlying Kohlberg's theory; Module II treats the stages of moral development; Module III discusses procedures and techniques for facilitating changes in moral reasoning: and Module IV considers the moral atmosphere of the school as it relates to the creation of a just community.

Unlike Blatt's procedure with high school and younger students which focused solely on discussing dilemmas, Mentkowski and Hersh seek to provide their teacher-candidates with both an overview of moral development theory and the practical experience of working in the classroom and discussing their own personal dilemmas with their peers. Their approach, then, is considerably more sophisticated and broader in scope both in light of the greater maturity of their students and of the advance in moral development theory and technique since Blatt's earlier work. They appear to work on three levels.

1. Their curriculum for teachers involves a heavily theoretical component. This includes extensive exposure to Piaget's stage

theory of cognitive development (Module I); explanation of Kohlberg's moral development theory and related research (Module II); a comparison of values clarification theory with moral development theory and description of various techniques and procedures for teaching moral development (Module III); and an extensive explanation of the just community concept as presently being implemented in two schools and a prison (Module IV).

2. The authors have attempted to integrate the theoretical component of their course with a teacher's practicum that includes learning by doing. Thus for example the teachers are required to administer Piagetian tasks concerning conservation of number, length, area, etc., to their own students; to conduct moral dilemma discussions and role-play with their students; using videotape to encourage their students to identify classroom situations in which students or the teacher "preach" about morality; to conduct "moral atmosphere" interviews in the schools in which they are interning, personally noting how decisions are made, by whom, how punishments are meted out, conducting their own rule-making sessions in the classroom, etc.

Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh provide no data indicating how much teacher-candidates themselves develop morally as a result of their course, however their multidimensional approach seems to offer greater promise of overall development than a unidimensional approach such as Blatt's of simply discussing moral dilemmas. The course further recommends itself because it has no hidden agenda; the teacher-candidates know the aim of the course is both their own development and the acquisition of the ability to facilitate moral development

themselves.

There are two negative considerations however: 1) the construction of the curriculum suggests that the primary objective of the course is to create competent teachers of moral development. The emphasis in terms of time and the focus of objectives seems to be more on facilitating growth in others than in self. Most of the exercises involve teacher-candidate activity in the practicum classroom rather than interaction among themselves. Just as counselor education all too often primarily emphasizes the acquisition of counseling skills in order to help the counselee without paying sufficient attention to the counselor as a person, so there seems to be a similar trend in many attempts at psychological education such as Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh's. If one conceives of education as a direct transfusion of information from one body to another then the personal presence of the teacher is of secondary importance. If, however, education is conceived of as part of a relational process affecting both "teacher" and "student" then the quality of that interaction becomes very important. In psychotherapy counselor-effectiveness depends less on the techniques used than on the counselor's ability to be present and aware of the counselee and of him or her self in relation to the counselee in a relatively undistorted way. So in psychological education, teachers need not only an evaluative awareness of their students but also an awareness of how their own interaction with students advances or retards the educational process. Teacher effectiveness depends less on how up-to-date their educational techniques are or even on how just and fair the

organization of their classroom or school is than it does on the people who employ the techniques and operate within the organization. Fairness and justice, respect for the other person and tolerance must be values they have internalized and made their own. No technique or structure will supply for that deficiency. Too little of the Mutterer-Mentkowski-Hersh curriculum is devoted to the self exploration and self evaluation among the teacher-candidates that will enable them to teach with awareness rather than simply employing techniques.

2) A second criticism flows from the first. In seeming contradiction to what I have just said, the teacher-candidates need to learn more group process skills. However they should learn these not just as techniques but first by experiencing as learners what it is like to have a teacher who listens to them, respects their difficulties and frustrations as learners and paces the presentation of materials according to their relative readiness and ability to assimilate it. Secondly, they would reflect upon what those qualities were, how they were employed and how they affected themselves as learners. Thirdly they would be given an opportunity to practice them, first on each other with appropriate feedback and finally in their practicum classroom. This process helps develop a genuine role-taking ability rightfully considered so important by cognitive-developmentalists. It consists of both the ability to project oneself into another person's experience and viewpoint and also to reverse the process and, as it were, perceive oneself from the other person's viewpoint with a concrete awareness of one's own impact on others. This ability, however, differs from Selman's (1976) conception of role-taking

insofar as it does not rely so much on an abstract, deductive ability to "figure out" what the other's viewpoint is as it is an on-going process skill which utilizes awareness and finely honed intuition fully as much as rational consciousness. Selman's role-taking ability which is highly useful in itself, requires a certain amount of distance, emotional neutrality and time to reflect. The process skill I am speaking of is immediate and frequently based on feelings but clearly differentiates between one's own feelings and viewpoint and those of the other. It is not empathy in the commonly understood sense of feeling <u>for</u> or <u>with</u> someone else for one clearly distinguishes and cognitively affirms the distinction between one's own position, viewpoint and feeling state and that of the other.

3. <u>The Just Community</u>. Fairly early on Kohlberg realized that moral education within the classroom would be ineffective if it ran counter to the morality implicitly taught through the structure and administration of the school (the hidden curriculum). Viewed more positively he reasoned that if these two could be synchronized, assuming that they both embodied developmental principles, then they would become powerful tools for moral development.

A first attempt at this, as mentioned in Chapter two, was in a single cottage in a female correctional institution (later expanded to include both sexes). There, by means of regular community meetings, prisoners were given the responsibility to determine policy issues, to decide on disciplinary action when rules were violated and generally to administer the running of the cottage conjointly with the staff on a one person, one vote basis (Kohlberg, Scharf and

Hickey, 1972).

The origin of the rules whereby the cottage was run was a "constitutional convention" at which prisoners and staff hammered out a commonly agreed on set of rules which both would live by. This was a long and harrowing process characterized by much mistrust on both sides. However, it was considered crucial that all concerned should have a say in the rules by which they would be governed.

Along with the creation of a democratic atmosphere at the cottage and a consistent concern for a fair administration of the rules, prisoners were also engaged in small group discussion of moral dilemmas. Focus soon moved from abstract dilemmas, such as those used by Blatt, to personal issues confronting participants both within the prison and "in the street." Unlike the former, these personal dilemmas generated considerable feeling among the participants. During a visit to the cottage I observed a very heated discussion about the right of prisoners to have sexual relations with each other (the cottage was in the early stages of forming a community comprised of both sexes). The issue appeared unresolvable on the cottage level since a general prison rule forbade sexual contact among prisoners.

Scharf (1974) reports that early results indicated that the mean moral maturity scores of the prisoners rose about one third of a stage (39 points) a little more than twice (17 points) that of an oral discussion group not involved in the cottage democracy. Two other control groups showed almost no change (control woman's prison, -2 point; control men's prison +2 points). About one half of the original experimental group had been released from prison and about a

year later there had been no recidivism (Kohlberg, Scharf and Hickey, 1972).

Subsequently Kohlberg and co-workers applied the moral atmosphere principle to the establishment of "experimental just schools" in Massachusetts and California.

The Cambridge, Massachusetts school began with 60 students and 7 teachers. Its curriculum focuses on social science and math. Students attend regular high schools for the remainder of their courses. Like the prison community, students and staff drew up a governing constitution. Compulsory weekly community meetings are held to discuss proposals which are implemented by a simple majority vote. There are, in addition small group sessions that prepare proposals for the larger community meetings, including disciplinary procedures for rule-breakers, new policies, etc. Other small groups provide counseling, staff training and mini-courses.

The Irvine, California school consists of 7 teachers and 200 students. Coursework focuses on interdisciplinary studies and frequently involves fieldwork in some sort of community education project. There are three levels of formalized social interaction in the school. Small interpersonal groups meet daily. From these groups and from the school at-large, students are elected to a representative council which has disciplinary authority. Regularly held community meetings can override decisions made by the representative council (Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh, 1975).

A difference in organization and curriculum of the two schools creates a slight difference in the students' focus of attention.

Because of their involvement in field work, the Irvine students found themselves confronted with moral dilemmas in the world outside the school. The Cambridge students, on the other hand, found their moral dilemmas in the actual running of their own school.

Again statistics concerning the growth of the students in these experimental schools are not available at this writing. One would expect, however, at least as great an upward movement as in the prison-experiment reported earlier. All these attempts to restructure the learning environment so that it embodies as nearly as possible the just community talked about in moral discussions, and provides multiple role-taking opportunities in real life situations, represent a real advance over the "canned discussion" formula of earlier attempts at moral education. Justice and the problems inherent in administering it need to be experienced on a first-hand basis, not simply talked about. It follows then, that teachers committed to moral education need, along with familiarity with moral theory, an ability to plan and perhaps to moderate the constitutional process whereby a given educational institution sets a system of justice in motion. Teachers might profitably look at the procedures followed by a town-meeting moderator to learn some of these skills. In addition they would need what students of group dynamics call "process skills." In general, these consist of an ability to monitor the interpersonal climate of a given group, to determine its emotional tone, where the genuine interest and energy of the group lies, where it is being blocked or dissipated and how, and to call the attention of the group to issues they may be avoiding which may be subverting the accomplishment of their goals.

In short, the skilled process person maintains a delicate balance between the human processes activated by any group meeting and the overt goal or agenda of that meeting and he or she attempts to teach the same skill to the participants.

My impressionistic observation of the cognitive-developmentalists both as they met among themselves at a 1974 conference and as an observer of the just community prison was that most of their process skills were procedural a la Robert's Rule of Order rather than personal. At both meetings feelings ran high among participants and in neither case were they explicitly acknowledged. Rather, repeated attempts were made to maintain discussion at a "problem-solving" cognitive level, attempts which bogged down because of a growing backlog of unattended feelings. In the latter instance, while the group leaders avoided some of the emotional excesses that some Synanon type therapeutic communities fall prey to, they seemed at the same time somewhat bewildered by the raw feelings of the prisoners and unsure about how to deal with them.

In this instance as with the Mutterer-Mentkowski and Hersh curriculum, more emphasis needs to be placed on teacher formation. There is no such thing as a good curriculum without a good teacher to implement it. And good teachers need not only to master the material but also the very human process of teaching it.

B. Humanistic-Developmental Approaches to Education

1. Deliberate Psychological Education. The educational goal of Deliberate Psychological Education is "to make personal development a central focus of education..." (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971). Sprinthall, Mosher and other proponents of this approach draw heavily on cognitive-developmental psychology for their theoretical orientation to education; however, their actual teaching practice more closely resembles a humanistic approach in the tradition of Rogers and Maslow. They have hypothesized that by teaching high school students counseling skills and involving them in a counseling practicum, they could raise the latters' developmental level as measured by the Kohlberg and Loevinger scales. For Sprinthall and Mosher, the course content is less important than the impact on the students' overall growth and development. They arrived at this conclusion from their own experience (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971, pp. 15-16):

> Having taught counselor education at the graduate level for seven years, we realized that the seminar and practicum experiences in counseling were powerful tools for raising questions of personal identity, the meaning of a helping relationship, understanding one's self and others in comprehensive ways, the complexity of hearing and responding to another person's ideas and feelings, the importance of emotions etc....There is little question that the impact of such experiences in counseling and supervision can promote personal growth for the counselor (and hopefully, too, for the client).

Thus, with Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) they see development as not only structural (through successive stages) but also content oriented (through the acquisition of better interpersonal skills such as the ability to listen and to respond appropriately). The authors' goal then was not to turn out a whole bevy of junior

counselors but to stimulate personal development.

Mosher and Sprinthall's first attempt at psychological education was at a public high school in Newton, Massachusetts. They offered a course in counseling, one of several electives in psychology from which students could choose. Since more than 800 of the school's 1700 population had elected courses in psychology, 24 students were randomly assigned to the experimental group and 24 to a control. Both groups were pre and post-tested using the Kohlberg moral development and the Loevinger ego development scales.

The format of the counseling course consisted of three phases. In phase one (which lasted six weeks) students engaged in role-play counseling. They alternated playing the role of counselor and client, tape recording the proceedings. Once a week they met as a class for three hours with the instructors to play and critique the tapes.

Phase two involved an unplanned shift. As students became more comfortable with each other, they stopped making up issues to discuss and began sharing real-life problems with each other. The instructors feared that this unplanned phase might initiate "an unending orgy of self-reference" but instead they "found the students swinging back and forth between their own internal frame of reference and the frame of reference of others" (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971, p. 25). During this phase students were able to articulate some of their uniquely adolescent problems to sympathetic peers, often for the first time. In a class discussion of a practicum in which she had played the role of counselor, one student articulated her own and her peers' feelings, (Ibid., p. 25):

> I just feel there are so many changes going on within me and there are so many changes going on within kids my age, you know, and I can't find this stabilizing thing, you know. It's just like shifting and moving and it'll settle down, you know; but at this point, it's just so scary, it's so drifting and lost, you know.

In the third phase the students began to counsel other students in the high school. This was worked out through the guidance department, who let it be known that some high school seniors had taken a special program in counseling and were available, under supervision, to talk with juniors who might have questions or concerns about college, job choices, senior course selection or other decisions. Class work during this phase consisted in reviewing tapes of actual sessions as had been done during the earlier phases. Issues discussed during this time included confidentiality, confrontation versus clarifying responses and avoiding "phony encouragement" and "put downs."

Post-tests administered at the end of the one semester course indicated a 1/3 stage change (from 3.22 to 3.56) on the Kohlberg scale. Of the 18 students taking the post-test, seven moved upward on the scale, nine remained the same and two regressed. Most movement was from Stage three, (the modal stage) to Stage four. The overall upward movement, however, while suggestive, was statistically significant only at the .08 level. There was no change in the control group.

For the Loevinger ego development pre and post-test scores there was a significant upward movement of the experimental group mean from delta 3 to 3/4. The former stage is characterized as "wary, self-protective, opportunistic conformism;" the former as "conscientious concern for communication, self-respect and conceptual complexity." The control group remained at delta /3 throughout the semester.

Several other variations of the Deliberate Psychological Education model have been attempted. Atkins (Mosher and Sprinthall, 1971) reports on the use of high school students to teach elementary school students with teacher supervision. The high school students met weekly to discuss assigned readings in education and group-process skills and to share their experiences in the teaching practicum.

The pre and post-test results were ambiguous. The Kohlberg test showed a non-significant ¼ stage increase while the Loevinger test showed a slight decrease in the post test--not an uncommon phenomenon as Loevinger herself has reported.

Still other variations were the teaching of improvisational drama, a course in child development, including a practicum in a nursery and peer counseling in the inner city. None of these provided developmental test data at the time of publication (1971). They represented, however, imaginative approaches to psychological education.

Sprinthall and Erickson, (1974) have continued similar experiments in the Minneapolis public school system with approximately the same results. In a course called "The Psychology of Counseling" about the same syllabus was followed as in the course in counseling described above. The students were taught the five point active-listening scale, were assigned readings in communications and viewed the Gloria films ("Three Approaches to Psychotherapy") counseling segments by Rogers, Perls and Ellis. In addition they practiced counseling with each other which, as before, soon focused on real rather than role-played problems.

The authors assert that there was an upward movement on the two

developmental scales employed but do not specify results. They are more specific about a women's study course offered to high school sophomore girls. The students were taught listening and interviewing skills prior to their field work which partially consisted of interviewing women across the life span. In role-play situations they learned how to ask Piaget type interview questions to gather data from their interviews. In addition, in seminar meetings, they were taught to analyze responses according to developmental criteria such as complexity of thought, differentiated feeling statements, etc. To supplement the live interviews the students also studied women in literature and from a developmental viewpoint examined such personalities as the 16 year old eponymous heroine of Sophocles' Antigone, Nora in Ibsen's A Doll's House, and Katherine in The Taming of the Shrew, etc.

Post-test results indicated a statistically significant upward movement on the Loevinger scale from Stage 3 (conformist) and Stage 3/4 (transition from conformist to conscientious) toward Stage 4 (conscientious and even to Stage 4/5 transition toward autonomous). As in the other studies, the post-test using the Kohlberg scale was less impressive. There was approximately a 1/3 stage increase, from Stage 3 toward Stage 4, of the group mean, which was significant, however, only at the .07 level. A control group composed of students from regular high school classes evidenced no change in either Loevinger or Kohlberg scores.

The difference in results between the Kohlberg and the Loevinger tests may be attributable to two things. First, the course

content in several of these projects appears to focus on the more generic concept of ego development than on moral development. Listening for greater conceptual complexity, clearer articulation of feelings etc., more closely resembles Loevinger's stage descriptions than Kohlberg's. Secondly, Kohlberg (1976) continues to insist that ego and moral stages are distinct. He asserts that, "to treat moral development as simply a facet of ego...development is to miss many of its special problems and features....The higher the moral stage, the more distinct it is from the parallel ego stage" (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 53). Hence, at least up to a point, ego development may be possible without a concomitant growth in moral development.

Deliberate Psychological Education represents an interesting and, to my mind, encouraging shift in emphasis when compared with the other attempts at developmental education outlined thus far. It has focused on the growth of the potential teacher as its primary goal rather than on imparting skills. This is not to imply that skill development was ignored or even minimized. Various measures not reported here, such as those developed by Carkhuff, (1971) indicated real counseling skill acquisition. However, the purpose of the various courses remained: to foster the development of the participants. The various authors do not discuss whether they think this approach is appropriate only on the high school level where de facto their focus was or whether this should indeed be the goal of teacher and counselor education on the college and graduate level. I contend that it would indeed be appropriate. It is the development of the whole teacher or counselor that makes him or her effective. The

beauty of the deliberate psychological education approach is that it demonstrates that fostering development and teaching skills need not be mutually exclusive educational objectives. In fact, at least in education for human services, the two are complementary. The D.P.E. approach, however, does leave some doubt as to its effectiveness in fostering moral development. Perhaps a more explicit focus on this facet of development than has thus far been attempted is required.

2. Confluent Moral Education. Picetti and Au, (1974) have borrowed the expression confluent education from George I. Brown, (1971) for their approach to moral education. They have not presented a curriculum as such but rather a series of suggestions as to the areas on which a curriculum should focus. They criticize many moral educators, especially the contributors to the Toronto Conference on moral education (Beck, Crittenden and Sullivan, 1971) for, "an obvious, disproportionate focus on the cognitive/rational components of moral behavior with the unfortunate consequence of neglecting an in-depth discussion of the affective dimensions of moral behavior" (Picetti and Au, 1974, p. 16). In attempting to remedy the deficit they draw not only on the work of Brown, (1971) but also on that of May, (1969), Wilson, (1969), Perls, (1972) and Assagioli, (1971).

I will mention, only in passing, several areas treated by them in which more attention might fruitfully be focused.

Unconscious motivation. Following Gustafson, (1970), they define as unconscious motivation "those presumably 'real' determinants of behavior which underlie and often are different from the reasons we give for our actions" (Picetti and Au, 1974, p. 19). The authors

suggest that it is not within the purview of education to attempt to delve deep into the unconscious. However, there is an unconscious "layer" that is phenomenologically nearer the surface of consciousness which can be profitably mined by education. The Gestalt awareness continuum, the guided fantasies of psychosynthesis, artwork, role-plays, dance, to name but a few means, can raise to the level of awareness aspects of our personalities including half-realized needs, goals and desires of which we were previously unaware. Greater awareness brings with it greater freedom and responsibility (i.e., the ability to respond) and expands the moral dimension of our lives. Greater awareness moves naturally from the level of cognition to the level of conation and bridges to some extent the artificial dichotomy sometimes set up between the two.

Rollo May's, (1969), somewhat popular explanation of the phenomenologists' concept of intentionality attempts to conceptualize this. Intentionality refers to the natural appetite of the human mind that carries it toward Being. Knowing something is not merely beholding it statically from afar; the act of knowing causes us to enter into relationship with the objects of our knowledge. We are inclined in their direction--hence the "knowing" of the bible refers to sexual intercourse. Intentionality then is not only the dynamism of knowing as originally defined by the phenomenologists but also the dynamism of action and includes the latter in its very definition.

However, "intending" something is not merely a conscious, intellectual function. The conscious and unconscious aspects of our personalities are possessed of their own dynamisms and spontaneous

"intentions," often in conflict with one another. One of the goals of a moral education of the "unconscious" could be to assist the student to bring these various dynamisms into fuller awareness--to "befriend" the inner world, as Picetti and Au happily express it (p. 61)--in order to utilize the energy latent in them. The techniques of Gestalt Therapy are particularly well suited to help mediate the often-conflicting claims and values of the many polarities in our personalities once they are raised to awareness and to unify and direct our psychic energy system toward our self-chosen goals.

Belief is another relatively unexplored aspect of moral education. The authors use Ausubel's definition of belief as "a genuine conviction, a disposition to behave in a certain way that is consonant with underlying thought and feeling" (Ausubel, 1971, p. 212). Genuine belief involves emotional and intellectual conviction and thus has a large affective component. Many beliefs, of course, are unexamined and frequently we are unaware of their influence on our actions. These can range from a belief, perhaps inherited from childhood experiences, that the world will never supply our material and emotional needs to a belief in an all-loving God. If either is a genuinely held belief it will certainly influence the way we act in moral crises. The former may cause one to act with "immoral" selfishness even against one's own conscience or moral judgment. The latter too may stimulate action that does not fit "normal" moral categories of thought. One can also see that this category parallels somewhat some of the thought already outlined in Chapter three. A spirituality always involves a

set of convictions which are not always logically defensible (though they may be) and include a profound affective component.

A moral education, then, that explores beliefs will have to find a way of reconciling beliefs as they affect our actions and our personal moral philosophies. Insofar as beliefs are unconscious or unexamined they will have to be brought into awareness, not necessarily for cold, intellectual analysis but in vivo, with their affect intact to see how they interact with, corroborate, or contradict our more "rational" (so we think) moral philosophies.

There are several means for dealing with both unconscious motivations and beliefs. Assagioli, (1971), for example, outlines six stages of the will (no relation to Kohlberg's stages) and related techniques which, he claims aids in the explication and integration of our unconscious motives, desires and beliefs into a comprehensive lived value system. He begins with an exploration of the unconscious and a deliberate valuing of its contents; a decision process follows, based on a clearer concept of one's values and a realization that choosing frequently means excluding some things of relatively less value; based on one's faith or conviction one then affirms that one's choice is worthwhile and valuable; one next plans the execution of one's choice which involves pre-visualizing, foreseeing intermediate steps, etc; the final step is the direction of execution which requires energy and persistence.

As one becomes increasingly more aware of one's unconscious motivations and beliefs and explores their implications, it is extremely helpful to have a structure or system to make sense out of

them. On a theoretical-cognitive level, a knowledge of Kohlberg's stages could help one identify and locate some of the moral elements. On a more personal level the use of the Trumpet developed by Gerald Weinstein (Weinstein and Fantini, 1970; Weinstein, 1973) provides a systematic process to enable one to inventory and explore the effects of a given belief or motivation on oneself, to explore and evaluate alternatives with a view to making self-aware choices. Weinstein's trumpet provides a more systematic way of deciding than does Assagioli and could profitably be integrated with the latter's "will theory." Kohlberg's "plus one match" approach could also be used with the trumpet when considering alternatives. In such a case, the teacher or facilitator would not only ask clarifying questions to assist the learner to generate alternatives, but also would pose moral considerations (when appropriate) and on occasion challenge the learner's thinking from a higher developmental level.

Picetti and Au then broaden the area of moral consideration to embrace conative, affective and unconscious elements of the personality more than any of the systems reviewed so far. They continue to respect the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education but are aware of its limitations and attempt to remedy them. They use a shot gun approach, however, and give little indication how their suggestions might be incorporated systematically into a curriculum.

3. An Experiment in Moral Education. A final example of an attempt to combine the cognitive-developmental approach with a humanistic orientation is an experimental class which John Piwko (1975), and I taught to a group of first year college men and women at a small

midwestern Catholic college. Unlike Mosher and Sprinthall, our course focused directly on the teaching of moral development. Our students were participants in a human development program entitled Basic Seminar in Human Development. As part of their curriculum they attended twice weekly "support groups" facilitated by graduate students working under staff supervision during which the students were encouraged to discuss whatever personal issues the college experience was creating for them. Piwko and I theorized that, as important as these groups were, they alone were insufficient to stimulate moral development. We therefore undertook to design a moral development "seminar" consisting of ten two-hour seminars which would utilize a small group format, but which would also consist of structured experiences as well as the presentation of moral development theory. We wanted to combine an objective, content orientation with an invitation to explore some of the students' personal feelings around such areas as guilt, duty to parents and authority, peer pressure, etc. We thus hoped to overcome the dichotomy between thinking and feeling that has afflicted moral education. We felt justified in attempting this somewhat risky undertaking because the students were accustomed to "dealing with feelings" in their support groups.

To test our hypothesis we offered our course to Basic Seminar students as an elective on a first-come basis. We accepted 15 students. We formed two control groups, one consisting of 15 Basic Seminar students chosen randomly from a pool of 30 (control group 1); the other (control group 2) consisted of 15 students from a regular freshman psychology course, none of whom were Basic Seminar students.

All three groups took the Defining Issues Test of Moral Judgment (DIT) developed by James Rest (1974, 1975), an objective test of moral judgment based on Kohlberg. The DIT consists of six dilemma stories. Using a Likert-type scale, subjects are asked to evaluate the importance of 12 issue-statements for each story in terms of their relative importance in resolving the dilemma. They then rank what they believe to be the four most important issue-statements. The DIT yields a "P" or principled score which can be expressed as a percentage ranging from zero to 95. The "P" score expresses what weight the subject attributes to principled issue-statements (statements expressing Stage 5 and 6 thinking) in resolving the dilemmas. The DIT, therefore, does not yield a stage score but only indicates what importance subjects attribute to principled thinking. It is based on the assumption that Stage 2 subjects, for example, will give less weight to principled thinking than Stage 3 subjects, Stage 3 subjects less weight than Stage 4 subjects, etc. An increase in the "P" score of a subject would imply developmental movement toward principled thinking.

All three groups were re-tested upon completion of the seminar. Since an equivalent forms version of the DIT was not available at the time, the same version was used as on the pre-test. Scoring was done by a computer.

The actual conducting of the seminar can perhaps best be described according to the somewhat artificial distinction between structure and content.

The <u>structure</u> of the seminar was that of a modified small

group. The atmosphere was relaxed. Except when films were shown, teachers and students sat on the floor or used cushions in a small room where group sessions were frequently held. Free interchanges between teachers and students took place and students were encouraged to express their feelings as well as their ideas, a function which the teachers attempted to model. In regular evaluation sessions held throughout the duration of the seminar students were also encouraged to express their needs and expectations. Although the teachers had drawn up a preliminary outline of the course content, adjustments were continually made on the basis of the on-going evaluation process. The teachers found that they tended to present more theoretical material than the students could assimilate at one time. In general the latter requested more time to digest the material and to relate it to their own experience.

The students took part with relative alacrity in relaxation exercises and discussions. The ease with which they did this is at least partly attributable to approximately two months' prior experience in small groups which they had been motivated enough to elect. In this regard they were probably not typical first-year college students. Piwko and I hope, however, that some of the enthusiasm with which the students participated in the seminar can be attributed to the care taken in structuring the seminar so that participants were listened to and encouraged to express their feelings. They also saw that changes were made in format in response to their feedback.

The course content focused on (a) the presentation of

developmental theory, (b) the presentation of some social issues in the light of developmental theory, and (c) exploration of personal reactions and feelings to moral issues. A format followed in most of the seminar was the exposure to an experience, e.g., a film or an exercise; the processing of the experience (what did you think? feel? do?) and a recording of the reactions in a notebook; and a mixture of theory and discussion to make some sense out of the experience. For example, in session 8, a half hour condensed version of A Man for All Seasons was shown. Students were then asked to discuss and record in their journals their personal reactions to the film. In addition they were asked to reflect on their own lives to see if there were values they would put their lives on the line for. Finally, on a more theoretical basis, they were asked to estimate what stage of moral thinking several different characters in the film seemed to be acting from (by this time Kohlberg's stage theory had been discussed in some detail).

The presentation of developmental theory included a discussion of the various ways of teaching morality as discussed in the first chapter. Also included was an explanation of Kohlberg's stage theory. Opportunity was provided to discuss and role-play moral dilemmas.

Some of the social issues explored derived from Milgram's (1974), experiments regarding obedience to authority. An exploration of racism was initiated by viewing a film on the Nazi concentration camps and led to a self assessment of racial attitudes among the seminar participants themselves. Attitudes regarding violence, its acceptance and portrayal in society, were investigated as a result

of an out-of-class assignment to view A Clockwork Orange which was showing on campus at the time.

In all these presentations and discussions the students were brought back to reflect on their own attitudes, feelings and values. This exploration of personal feelings and reactions was fostered through regular journal entries during and after class time, through discussion and confrontation of differing viewpoints among participants and by structured exercises.

One such exercise involved a guided fantasy during which the students were asked to allow an image to form at the mention of the word "conscience." One student describes his experience:

> I opened my vision with only a yellow background. Across this background moved a dark object too fuzzy to be deciphered. Slowly, this object moved in my general direction till it finally stopped only a short distance from me. It was nothing but a big, black, jagged rock out of which resounded a nonsensical voice. I stood there in its shadow staring at it in a defiant manner, while it appears to examine me....Shortly thereafter the image faded into a dark background and the fantasy ended. Little need be said regarding how I apparently feel toward my top dog (conscience). Defiance sums it up well.

A better representation of conscience as alien and heteronomous could scarcely be imagined. The student, an eager learner, pleasant and almost too agreeable, in other words well-socialized, was getting in touch with the suppressed part of himself that wanted to defy the conventions which at some level speak only gibberish to him. It appears that, although the student would probably score at the conventional level on Kohlberg's scale, there persists an unsocialized residue, the "shadow" of which Jung and Neumann speak, in revolt against social convention and being a "good boy."

In another fantasy exploring the source of their moral injunctions students imagined: a first grade nun waggling her finger, Jesus saying "relax," a woman intervening to stop one man from stabbing another, a crowd of friends and a young man named "Be Moral" trying in vain to get their attention. As time permitted, students role-played the various parts of their fantasies to identify and explore them further. Their final report on the seminar indicated that many of them sensed the splits in themselves both between the moral set they had been raised to follow and were now questioning, and between idealized actions they presently envisioned and their ability to implement them. As one student wrote pithily: "Somehow it seems easier to 'die' for a cause than to 'have one's head cut off' for a cause. Somehow it seems easier to say you will do one than the other, even though they are both the same."

The results of the post-test indicated that the experimental group has increased its "P" score by 8.05%, from 44.72% to 52.77% which was significant at the .05 level. Control group one, students in the Basic Seminar in Human Development but not participants in the moral development seminar, increased 1.53% from 45.55% to 47.08%. Control group two, students in a first-year psychology class decreased .83% from 39.44% to 38.61%. In neither control group was the change significant.*

The seminar raised more issues than it solved. In written and oral feedback at its conclusion, the majority of participants expressed regret that the seminar was over. They especially wanted to

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*For further statistical analysis see Piwko, 1974, or summary in Appendix.

explore more personal moral issues. As a result a second seminar was organized which focused on personal moral issues. This seminar was not included in our statistical study. Its format was less formal than the first but generally followed the formula of providing a stimulating event, usually a structured exercise, followed by an opportunity to process what each participant experienced during the event. Finally, individuals volunteered or requested time to explore an issue that the initial stimulus or an occurrence outside had touched off.

The dividing line between this seminar and a therapy group is very thin. The main difference was that the participants came to the "seminar" with a theoretical orientation in moral development from the first seminar and that they worked on issues that had specifically moral implications for them.

A year and a half later a follow-up questionnaire was sent to all participants in the moral development seminar to determine what effect, if any, the seminar had had on their every day lives. Only six of the fifteen participants replied. Reactions varied--four reported that when it came to making moral decisions they believed that they were more aware of the importance of following their own judgment and experience over against just doing what a rule dictates. As one put it:

> I do not place such an emphasis on rules. I tried to see beyond rules. I take the situation that I am in as a special circumstance.

Another said that the course "at first made me very bitter--it made me challenge a lot of my so-called "values" and "morals."

Another said that the seminar enabled him to balance an

objective appraisal of a situation against the "human element" involved.

From these replies, as well as from the self-reports submitted at the end of the course, there is little doubt that the course genuinely affected the participants' thinking, influencing them in the direction of greater flexibility and tolerance of ambiguity. Evidence however, that the seminar had a direct influence on moral actions is much more ambiguous. Two of the six students who replied listed several activities (fasting from one meal to donate the proceeds to Guatemalan earthquake victims, working with the mentally retarded, etc.) in which they became involved subsequent to the course but these, of course, cannot be attributed directly to the seminar itself. Two others expressed doubt that the seminar influenced their subsequent actions at all. All six respondents, on the other hand, believe that in one way or another the seminar (some times combined with other experiences) has influenced the way they relate to other people. Most make such comments as "putting myself in another's shoes" more often, being more accepting of others' ideas, standing up for one's own beliefs more, etc. One student remarks that she feels more negatively about people but is unsure if that is as a result of the seminar or not!

Though these replies cannot be considered more than anecdotal, they suggest that the seminar did have a positive impact on the thinking and attitudes of the participants. However, they also suggest that in order to affect moral actions a more comprehensive approach is required than a single course offering.

Conclusion. It is apparent from this brief overview of moral education that many innovations have occurred since Blatt's work in a Jewish Sunday School. It also appears that developmental and humanistic approaches to education can work hand-in-hand to produce involving and effective curricula. No curriculum, however, is teacher-proof. A common variable of all the studies reviewed here is that all the courses were taught by highly skilled teachers. Concomitant, then, with the development of curricula should be comprehensive training of teachers. In the chapter that follows I will outline a teacher training program which will include the salient features of the best attempts at developmental education. In line with the overall orientation of this work I will endeavor to include a segment on spirituality as well.

C H A P T E R V

A DEVELOPMENTAL CURRICULUM FOR TEACHERS

In Chapter four I reviewed some of the attempts to design developmental curricula. I observed that with the exception of that of Mentkowski-Hersh, all the curricula were aimed at young people. It was apparently assumed that the teachers themselves possessed the requisite skills to teach development successfully. There is a certain logic in this. In the design of an experimental curriculum one naturally focuses on the people one wishes to teach rather than oneself, the teacher. However, as in physics, one must ultimately consider the effect of the observer on the thing observed; even more so in teaching one must be cognizant of the impact of the teacher in the classroom. The quality of the teacher-student interaction will depend a great deal on the personality and formation of the teacher. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that the level of development of the teacher will serve as a limit to the potential development of the student.

In this final chapter, then, I outline a curriculum for teachers aimed at fostering their own development. In this, it differs from Mentkowski and Hersh, It resembles theirs in that it does not rest content with fostering development; it is also designed to impart specific teaching skills which in turn will aid the development of

students. Research in Deliberate Psychological Education indicates that teaching certain skills in itself facilitates the development of the learner.

Goal of the Curriculum. The goal of the developmental curriculum for teachers, then, is twofold. First, it is to facilitate the holistic development of teachers so that they, in turn, will more effectively aid the development of their students. Two of the primary foci of this first goal are moral and spiritual value development.

The second goal is to equip teachers with the knowledge, skills and techniques to foster development in others.

Research supports the contention that short-term interventions seldom have long-term effects. This curriculum, therefore, would extend over a fairly long period of time (a minimum of two years). Preferably the several modules envisioned would be interspersed throughout a long-term teacher-training program. It would be important however, that all the modules be integrated under a comprehensive viewpoint so that each would contribute in its own way to overall development.

Method

The method would proceed along three fronts. First (not necessarily in chronological order), would be the teaching of theory and cognitive skills. Students, for example, would familiarize themselves with Piaget's stage theory of cognitive development. They would do so both by reading and lecture but also more experientially by experimenting with some of Piaget's learning tasks and administering them to others. Secondly students would be involved in

"laboratory" or personal growth experiences. They would wrestle with Kohlbergian moral dilemmas themselves; they would struggle with the practical problems and frustrations of a "constitutional convention" to develop guidelines for their own learning community; they would meet in small support groups and develop process skills with each other before attempting to assume a teacher's role with others.

Thirdly they would be involved in practicum experiences. Like Mosher and Sprinthall's students they might do supervised counseling to develop further their process skills; they might intern at a "just school" or alternate between participating and/or observing a "just prison community" model and a "therapeutic community" model to compare the two.

Ideally the students would be continuously reinforcing experience with cognitive constructs, and adapting cognitive constructs to match their experience in a progressive spiral of assimilation and accommodation.

Keeping in mind the overall goals of the curriculum and that these three teaching orientations would be employed throughout, let us now survey several essential modules of a comprehensive developmental curriculum.

1. Developmental Theory. This module would familiarize students with some of the developmental theories. These would include:

Piaget's cognitive stage theory,

Kohlberg's moral stage theory, including his meta ethical "Stage 7."

Loevinger's ego stage theory,

Erikson's psychosocial stage theory.

As mentioned earlier, students would be expected not only to be able to describe the various developmental theories but also to perform some of the cognitive tasks associated with them. They may for example, generate responses prototypical of given stages, construct dilemmas highlighting certain issues in moral development, analyze and score the responses to various developmental problems, or examine their own lives, via structured exercises, to determine developmental issues they are presently confronting, etc.

2. The "Just Community". Included here would be an examination of the social structures which promote justice particularly in a learning community. A Theory of Justice by John Rawls (1971), might serve as a theoretical base but an historical review of various attempts to found humane societies from the Greek city state down to the latest adventures in communal living would also be advantageous.

On the experiential level, students would be included in the governing of their own learning community according to the principles of justice. In addition, they would be provided an opportunity to observe and to analyze other social environments through practicum assignments and the use of Kohlberg's Moral Atmosphere Interview.

3. Process Skills and Their Application to Teaching. This module ought to be taught early in the curriculum sequence because process skills can be employed effectively at virtually every stage of the teaching-learning cycle particularly while interviewing,

leading discussions, during community meetings, etc. This is also the area that nearly all moral development curriculum designers overlook.

Process refers to the ebb and flow of awarenesses, feelings and actions which characterize any human interaction. It is usually distinguished from the overt agenda or "content" of the same interaction, e.g., discussing an amendment to a motion, teaching the forms of irregular Greek verbs, talking about my relationship with my wife. Unless otherwise directed, most of our attention focuses on the content. Yet the energy and dynamism of human interactions derives from the process. Process skills enable a teacher to monitor the flow of an interchange, identify blocks, and periodically to focus the awareness of participants on what is helping or hindering the completion of their agenda. In addition to logical processes, the skilled process person respects feelings and emotions and knows how to utilize the energy of the latter constructively.

One of the most common complaints about moral development theory is its inability to integrate affect into its structure. On a practical level this is reflected in exclusively content-oriented teaching styles. This module, therefore, is included as a partial remedy for this lack.

George Brown's Human Teaching for Human Learning (1971), is one of the better books for suggestions on how to blend process and content into one's teaching style. Wyatt (1972), has outlined a course in process skills which, like Mosher and Sprinthall's, involves learners from the very beginning in an experiential fashion. Her

course, however, unlike the other authors, focuses on process in an almost chemically pure way. Students learn how to be aware of five basic process events while interacting with each other. They have the opportunity to focus awareness on these events so that they can experience the frequently dramatic outcomes of a shift in focus from content to process.

The final step of this module would be enabling students to use their process skills in a practicum setting and to receive feedback on their effectiveness. An alternative would be to rotate group leadership in a group of peers and to receive feedback from them.

4. Infra-Rational Value Sources. Cognitive-developmentalists continue to over-simplify the influence of cognitive processes on a person's actions. Contrary to the platonists' contention, to know the good is not necessarily to do it. This module would acquaint the prospective teacher with some psychological attempts to explain, from below as it were, the gap between knowing and doing. Beginning with Freud's explanation of the development of the superego or conscience, it would explore Jung's and Neumann's theory of socialization and the development of the shadow and the persona and the integration of conscious and unconscious processes in the self. In addition it would survey more recent conceptualizations of non-rational motivating forces and complexes such as Berne's Parent, Adult, and Child; and Perl's Gestalt polarity theory and his Top Dog, Underdog characters.

These various theoretical constructs would serve as a backdrop for the students'own exploration of the hidden motivational forces that, to a large extent, influence their moral actions. Of particular

value in this experiential segment would be the use of guided fantasies, Gestalt "dream work", role-playing, art, and dance. There are a myriad such exercises described in books by Assagioli (1971, 1974), Sevens (1971), Hall (1976), Perls, Hefferline and Goodman (1951), and others.

To achieve at least the beginning of a personal synthesis between cognitive and affective influences on one's actions, students would be encouraged to reflect (perhaps in a journal and/or by using objective measures on themselves, such as Rest's Defining Issues Test), on how well they coordinate their cognitive conceptions and their "gut reactions." For example, they may discover that, though they recognize and appreciate principled moral thinking, their emotional reactions derive from a preconventional level. When making a real moral choice, one may act out of fear (Stage 1) or for personal advantage (Stage 2) even while recognizing the superiority of moral reasoning at a higher level. Nor does this necessarily brand such a person as a hypocrite. There may be powerful familial and environmental structures reinforcing such patterns of behavior on an habitual or pre-conscious level. Appreciating higher levels of reasoning is one way (possibly a necessary but not sufficient cause) of changing moral behavior. However, a direct analysis and confrontation with these habits themselves using, for example, Weinstein's Trumpet or Assagioli's stages of the will also seems necessary to convert thought into reasonable and responsible action.

5. Super-Rational Value Sources. The infra-rational value sources operate from below,* both in relation to the level of consciousness and awareness and in regard to lower moral stages. Super-rational value sources exert their influence from above both in the sense of furnishing motivation for moral action that logic cannot provide and in the sense of emanating from a higher level of consciousness. Some have called this the realm of the transcendent or the transpersonal. Traditionally that terminology has been associated with God, mysticism and prayer. More recently psychologists such as Maslow and Assagioli have used it in reference to the apex of the human personality which exists in relationship to ultimate meaning and Being. As psychologists they have rightfully stopped short of affirming the existence of or of attempting to define what sort of Reality would satisfy this human aspiration for meaning and motivate moral action.

This module would expose the aspiring teacher to some of the work of transpersonal psychologists particularly as they refer to motives for action. As we saw in Chapter three, moral judgment like logic, cannot justify itself by its own rules of procedure but must fall back on "first principles" which are intuitive rather than logical

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*"Below" should not necessarily be understood here as "inferior" but rather as lower on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, e.g., goods necessary for self preservation, or as derived from the rich soil of the unconscious. Genuine personal and moral development cannot mean transcending these foundations of the person, (that would be angelism rather than humanism), but rather synthesizing them. There will always be a polar tension between the rational and the infra-rational, nor is one reducible to the other, but "dialogue" between the two cannot help enriching the entire person.

(the medieval synderesis) and self-justifying. In the peak of mystical experience, meaning and value coincide in a synoptic, intuitive grasp of reality which may (or may not) become incarnated in a Way around which the person organizes his or her life. We have called these spiritual or meta-ethical values. They carry with them religious (or semi-religious) and moral overtones.

Students would familiarize themselves with the systems of such men as James, Jung, Maslow, Neumann, and Assagioli. Of particular value because of their attempt to synthesize the goals of psychology, education and various spiritual disciplines are the works of Naranjo and Ornstein, (Naranjo and Ornstein, 1971, Naranjo, 1972, Orstein, 1972).

In keeping with the experiential orientation of the curriculum, the learners would, in addition, participate in exercises designed to activate their own intuitive facilities and to relate them to their Way of life. Again there are a multitude of techniques which could be employed. Among them are Benson's relaxation response (1975), Assagioli's (1971), spiritual psycho-synthesis techniques, the Arica psychocallisthenics and meditative exercises as well as more traditional "religious" exercises derived from Zen Sufism, etc. Brian Hall's The Development of Consciousness (1975), would be helpful here because it combines exercises which attempt to synthesize spiritual and moral values and because it has a developmental orientation.

Conclusion. This curriculum aims at a threefold expansion for the teacher-aspirants. Hopefully they will have expanded their awareness of both the heights and depths of their own personalities

by experiencing more of their subliminal or unconscious power and motivation along with their teleological orientation toward a source of meaning beyond their conscious selves. Secondly their thinking will have become more critical, self-aware and better able to deal with the complexities and dilemmas of modern life. Thirdly they would have begun to integrate the thinking, feeling and acting facets of their personalities and to experience themselves acting more as wholes than as parts in opposition to each other. This is the highest aim of education and as teachers they can play an integral part in the development of the human species.

APPENDIX

Table 1:* Mean percentage scores of DIT pre-test data at each stage as used in initial chi-square

Stage	2	3	4	5A	5B	6	A	M	P
experimental	4.58	13.88	23.88	26.52	14.02	6.52	3.74	6.80	47.08
control group one	7.63	9.58	33.61	23.74	7.77	7.08	6.80	3.74	38.61
control group two	4.16	14.58	17.63	27.91	15.55	9.30	4.16	6.66	52.77

chi-square = 5.80 n.s.

* All data in this Appendix provided by Piwko (1974)

Table 2: Mean "P" percentage scores and standard deviations of pre and post-test DIT for all three groups

	EXPERIMENTAL		CONTROL ONE		CONTROL TWO	
	PRE	POST	PRE	POST	PRE	POST
MEAN	44.72	52.77	45.55	47.08	39.44	38.61
SD	10.42	10.52	13.95	13.03	14.27	16.34

Table 3: Planned comparisons of pre and post mean "P" percentage scores

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Between	1636.39	5	---	---
experimental pre vs post	381.19	1	381.19	6.890*
control one pre vs post	4.05	1	4.05	.073
control two pre vs post	23.77	1	23.77	.429
exp and cont 1 vs cont 2	1168.07	1	1168.07	3.560
residual	59.31	1	59.31	.309
Error for repeated measures	1827.19	33	55.37	
Error for non-repeated measures	10832.98	33	328.27	

*$p < .05$



FIGURE 1: Frequency distribution of moral judgment scores for experimental group



FIGURE 2: Frequency distribution of moral judgment scores for control group 1



FIGURE 3: Frequency distribution of moral judgment scores for control group 2

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